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Under the dominant account, securities fraud by public firms harms the firms’
shareholders and, more generally, capital markets. Recent financial legislation—the
JOBS Act and the Dodd-Frank Act—as well as the influential 2011 D.C. Circuit
decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC reinforce that same worldview. This Article
contends that the account is wrong. Misreporting distorts economic decision-making
by all firms, both those committing fraud and not. False information, coupled with
efforts to hide fraud and avoid detection, impairs risk assessment by providers of
human and financial capital, suppliers and customers, and thus misdirects capital
and labor to lower-value projects. If fraud is caught, managers externalize part of
the cost of litigation and enforcement to employees, creditors, suppliers, and the
government as the insurer of last resort. Mounting empirical evidence suggests that
harm to non-shareholders dwarfs that suffered by defrauded shareholders.
Moreover, unlike investors, who can limit their exposure to securities fraud by
diversifying their holdings and demanding a fraud discount, other market
participants cannot easily self-insure. The Article supplies both theoretical and
empirical support for the assertion that defrauded investors are not the only victims
of securities fraud. In conclusion, the Article outlines and assesses some alternative
fraud deterrence and compensation mechanisms.
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INTRODUCTION
Just over ten years ago, WorldCom announced that its financial
disclosures were fiction. Accounting fraud at WorldCom ultimately
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destroyed tens of billions of dollars in investors’ equity and pushed the firm
into bankruptcy.1 When it emerged two years later as MCI, Inc., it had shed
33,000 employees, more than a third of its workforce.2 Its general unsecured
creditors ultimately received only 36 cents on the dollar.3 While WorldCom
was fabricating its financials, its rivals, Sprint and AT&T, made business
decisions believing that WorldCom’s success was real. Under pressure from
its own shareholders, AT&T cut $7.5 billion in costs and laid off 20,000
employees. Still unable to compete with WorldCom’s imaginary figures,
AT&T split itself into three units, which were sold individually—a decision
then, and now, widely viewed as value destroying. In fact, during the fraud,
WorldCom’s true costs were higher than AT&T’s.4 Telecommunication
equipment manufacturers, including Lucent Technologies and Nortel
Networks, initially benefitted from WorldCom’s apparent success, but
suffered when the industry retrenched after the fraud was revealed. Both
suppliers fired workers and saw their equity shrink.5 In the aftermath of the
WorldCom fraud, the telecommunications industry as a whole lost a quarter
of its jobs, 300,000.6 WorldCom’s share price, the usual yardstick for
measuring harm from securities fraud, captured none of these harms.
WorldCom might be an outlier, but it is hardly unique.7 By misreporting
their firm’s financial results and prospects, managers credibly communicate

1
Before fraud was unmasked, WorldCom was one of the largest telecommunications
companies with $160 billion in assets. Ken Belson, WorldCom’s Audacious Failure and Its
Toll on an Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at C1.
2
See Steve Alexander, Former Holders of MCI Stock Miss Out: The Bidding War for
MCI Will Enrich the Firm's Shareholders—the Current Ones, STAR TRIBUNE, May 1, 2005, at
D1.
3
See Official Comm’t of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73, 84–85
(2d Cir. 2006) (observing that general unsecured creditors recovered 36 cents on the dollar
and limiting the distribution of the SEC Fair Fund proceeds to those investors who have
recovered less).
4
Rebecca Blumenstein & Peter Grant, On the Hook: Former Chief Tries to Redeem Calls
He Made at AT&T, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2004, at A1. See also Gil Sadka, The Economic
Consequences of Accounting Fraud in Product Markets: Theory and a Case from the U.S.
Telecommunications Industry (WorldCom), 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 439, 459–60 (2006)
(showing that AT&T and Sprint performed much better than WorldCom between 1999 and
2002, the period of fraud).
5
Edward J. Romar & Martin Calkins, WorldCom Case Study Update,
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/dialogue/candc/cases/worldcom-update.html/ (last visited Aug. 8,
2012).
6
Alexander, supra note 2, at D1.
7
But see Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary
Securities Regulation 44 (Geo. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Res. Paper No. 12-004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1984686/ (suggesting that WorldCom and Enron were different
because of their size).
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to markets8 that the firm is less risky than it in fact is. Managers sell the lie
by increasing hiring and investment, and cutting prices. Relying on false
information, lenders underprice credit, employees make career and
retirement decisions based on a false picture of their firm’s prosperity, and
rivals make business decisions on a distorted playing field.9 Honest firms
face the obverse effect of fraud and cannot fund and employ workers for
valuable projects, producing additional deadweight losses borne by all
workers, primary-market capital investors, and beyond.
If fraud is caught, fraudulent firms spend substantial resources on
investigation, litigation, damages and fines. Many file for bankruptcy or
make costly adjustments, that they often shift to employees, creditors,
suppliers, customers, and the government (as the insurer of last resort).
Rivals face doubts about their own financial reporting, which increases their
cost of capital and further depresses hiring in the industry. The ripple effects
are felt throughout the economy and, once aggregated, exceed the harms to
defrauded shareholders by a substantial margin.10
Not only are investors not the only victims of securities fraud, the Article
contends that they are in the best position to reduce their exposure to fraud.11
They can eliminate firm-specific risk through diversification. Diversification
cannot eliminate undiversifiable or market risk of fraud, but investors
demand a fraud discount when purchasing securities as ex ante
compensation. While investors as a group benefit if the prevalence of fraud
decreases, they are indifferent to securities fraud if its impact remains stable.
Those supplying labor, on the other hand, cannot diversify their human
capital at all, and are exposed to the risk that securities fraud by their
employer will eliminate their job and impair their earning potential.
8
The Article uses the term “markets” broadly, to include capital and labor markets,
product markets, as well as intermediate markets. An appropriate adjective is used whenever
the term is used narrowly (e.g., securities markets).
9
See Cynthia A. Glassman, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Financial Reform: Relevance
and Reality in Financial Reporting, Sept. 16, 2003, http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch091603cag.htm. One might also add to the list suppliers, vendors, customers,
communities, and the government as the “insurer of last resort.” John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 72
(1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Shareholders vs. Managers].
10
No model built to date can provide a solid estimate the aggregate cost of fraud. Two
empirical studies measured the effect of accounting fraud on the stock prices of rivals. Both
found that aggregate equity market losses by rivals exceed those by fraudulent firms by a
factor of four. See Art Durnev & Claudine Mangen, Corporate Investments: Learning from
Restatements, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 679, 699 (2009); Eitan Goldman, Irina Stefanescu & Urs
Peyer, Financial Misrepresentation and Its Impact on Rivals 27 & fig. 3, FIN. MGMT.
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=774364/. Other studies cited in Parts III
and IV infra have found evidence of cost-shifting to labor and product markets, and reduced
investment after fraud.
11
Assuming no primary offerings.
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Surprisingly, the recognition that investors do not bear the full cost of
securities fraud is largely missing from our securities laws, from statutes to
rulemaking,12 enforcement decisions to judicial opinions,13 policy debates14
to academic analysis.15 Corporate governance reforms adopted in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act after the rash of accounting scandals in 2001-02 were
widely criticized because of their purportedly high cost for investors.16 One
of the critics’ recent successes is the JOBS Act which relaxed reporting and
audit requirements for newly-public firms on the supposition that lower cost
of compliance must necessarily lead to job creation.17 Another success is the
D.C. Circuit’s decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC which requires the
SEC to demonstrate that the rules it proposes “increase shareholder value.”18
That decision has brought to a standstill financial reform rulemaking,
authorized by the Dodd-Frank Act—the Act that was adopted in the wake of
a financial crisis that caused widely-dispersed economic pain.
Securities commentators frequently warn that “onerous disclosure
obligations and their accompanying liability are like the rain—they fall on
the good and the bad alike.”19 But securities fraud, too, harms honest and
dishonest firms, and their employees, creditors, and other constituents. With
all costs included and tallied, the following conclusions are inescapable: (1)
false disclosure affects financial markets as well as markets for inputs, labor
12
The Dodd-Frank Act, for example, put in place a variety of mechanisms designed to
empower shareholders. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
13
See e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729 (1975).
14
See COMM’N ON THE REG. OF U.S. CAP. MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (2007), available at http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/
reports/0703capmarkets_full.pdf/ (concluding that the purposes of securities regulation are
investor protection and fostering capital formation).
15
The most commonly used securities regulation textbook lists two dozen article for the
proposition. JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 745–47 (6th ed. 2009).
16
See e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Oxley: Legislating in Haste, Repenting in
Leisure, 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 69 (2006) (criticizing the law because it increased the
costs of corporate compliance); Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 279, 280–81 (2004); Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark (Dec. 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974148/ (proposing sunset
clauses for financial reform laws); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making
of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (arguing that the SarbanesOxley Act was unnecessary); Ivy X. Zhang, Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (March 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=961964/ (arguing that SOX cost U.S. equity markets $1.4
trillion).
17
H.R. 3606 (112th Cong.).
18
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
19
COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 15, at 745.
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and credit, and product markets; (2) framing securities fraud as fraud against
investors understates the harm it causes; and (3) regulation and enforcement
predicated on the assumption that securities fraud does not impose
substantial negative externalities on non-shareholders leads to
underregulation and underdeterrence of fraud, and offers remedies that do
not redress the injury.20
In Part I, the Article provides a brief overview of securities laws that
require disclosure and sanction fraud. It also describes the existing consensus
that securities fraud harms primarily investors, by reducing capital market
liquidity, depressing investor returns by misallocating capital, and impairing
shareholder monitoring.
Parts II, III and IV constitute the major contributions that this Article
makes to the literature. In Part II, the Article explains analytically how false
securities disclosures distort and harm non-financial markets. First, public
firms’ financial disclosures are made publicly, not only to present and future
shareholders, and provide information that is useful to a variety of market
participants. To avoid detection, managers also change the firms’ observable
actions to match false disclosures. False disclosures lead suppliers of
financial as well as human capital to underprice their inputs. Second, if
unmasked, securities fraud is very costly for the firm, and managers often
pass the cost onto non-shareholders. Third and finally, securities fraud
interferes with economic learning, distorts real economic decisions by rivals,
and impairs product markets. In Parts III and IV, the Article details how
employees and rivals, specifically, are harmed by financial disclosures
intended for shareholders. In each Part, the Article supplements the
theoretical analysis with empirical evidence.
In Part V, the Article discusses the determinants of the cost of securities
fraud. Not surprisingly, fraud by a larger firm and larger fraud relative to the
size of the firm tends to produce a greater market distortion and cost.21 Less
well known, competition has a profound effect on the prevalence and the cost
of securities fraud. First, fraud is generally more likely in concentrated than
in competitive markets. But, during investment booms, when competitive
pressure disappears, previously competitive markets succumb to fraud.
Second, false disclosure by firms in concentrated markets is more likely to
distort decision-making by rivals. Third, market concentration amplifies the
ability of managers to shift the cost of fraud from shareholders to nonshareholders.
20

Even if the cost calculus were adjusted, enforcement strategies might still underdeter
when the sanction is placed on the firm if the firm cannot effectively shift it to deter the
individuals who commit fraud. See e.g., Urska Velikonja, Leverage, Sanctions, and
Deterrence of Accounting Fraud, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1281 (2011) [hereinafter Velikonja,
Leveraged Sanctions].
21
See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 7, at 44.
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Finally, in Part VI, the Article proposes a few solutions. If false financial
disclosures distort real economic decisions by market participants, either
directly or indirectly as managers change investment, hiring and pricing, less
public disclosure might reduce the harm to non-shareholders.22 Alternately,
better disclosure at the same cost ought to reduce the likelihood and duration
of fraud. Forensic audits, enforcement targeted at high-risk firms, and qui
tam actions for whistleblowers produce superior deterrence outcomes at the
same cost, if traded off for costlier, but ineffective compliance tools. Finally,
the negative externalities of financial misrepresentations are dispersed
among many firms and individuals. Forcing fraudulent firms and their
managers to internalize the cost of securities fraud would improve their
incentives to avoid fraud. The Article considers whether victims of securities
fraud other than shareholders could bring lawsuits for common law fraud
against the fraudulent firm and its managers. It concludes that although
possible, these suits face high hurdles of reliance and damages. Unlike
private plaintiffs, the SEC does not need to show actual reliance or damages
to find a violation and impose a civil fine. The Article considers whether the
SEC has the authority, under the Fair Funds Statute in Section 308 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, to distribute civil fines and disgorged profits it collects
from securities violators to non-shareholder victims.23 A close reading of the
text of the statute and the legislative history suggests that the case for
compensating non-shareholder victims is surprisingly strong.
I. THE REGULATION OF SECURITIES FRAUD
The Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act were adopted in the
in the wake of the 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression that
followed.24 The securities acts put in place safeguards to prevent history from
repeating itself, including a system of mandatory public disclosure and
sanctions for disclosure violations and fraud. This Part reviews both, the laws
that mandate disclosure and punish missing, false, or fraudulent disclosures,
and the existing literature on why we need to prevent securities fraud, which
has revolved almost exclusively around the costs of fraud to investors.
A. A Summary of Regulation

22

The Article considers both, the same amount of disclosure that is less public and a
reduced amount of public disclosure.
23
15 U.S.C. §7246(a) (authorizing the SEC to distribute to victims of securities
violations disgorgement funds and civil penalties it collects from defendants).
24
The crash harmed “thousands of individuals who invested their life savings,
accumulated after years of effort.” H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
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Modern American securities regulation is a system of disclosure
regulation, coupled with the regulation of financial market intermediaries,
such as exchanges and broker-dealers, and public firms.25 Disclosure-based
regulation aims to reduce the information asymmetry between firms that
offer securities and investors who buy them.26 It assumes that so long as
investors have access to information about the issuers of securities and the
rights those securities confer, they can assess the risks and the returns of
investment products, and decide whether and at what price to buy or sell.
To that end, the securities acts and implementing regulations require
firms to disclose relevant information about their financial condition,
products and markets, management, and competitive and regulatory climate
both episodically, whenever they offer securities to the public,27 and
periodically thereafter (annually, quarterly, and whenever significant events
warrant disclosure). Regulations S-K and S-X specify not only what
information must be disclosed, but also when, and in what manner, to
produce disclosures that are available and easily comparable across firms.28
To induce compliance, securities laws prohibit and punish disclosures
that are materially false, misleading, or, in some cases, missing, and entrust
private and public agents with enforcement.29 The securities acts do not make
firms liable for every inaccurate disclosure. A misrepresentation must be
25

Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (explaining that the fundamental
purpose of the Exchange Act was to substitute the policy of caveat emptor with full
disclosure).
26
Few remember today that the original draft of federal securities laws proposed merit
review of securities offerings. See S. 875 & H.R. 4314, 73d Cong. 1st Sess. §§ 6(c), (e), (f)
(1933), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at Item 28 & 22, at 13 (1973) (authorizing revocation of an issuer’s
registration upon a finding that “the enterprise or business of the issuer, or person, or the
security is not based upon sound principles, and that the revocation is in the interest of the
public welfare,” or that the issuer “is in any other way dishonest” or “in unsound condition or
insolvent”).
27
Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(2), (c), 15 U.S.C. §77e(b)(2), (c) (2011).
28
See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is
not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1376–78 (1999) [hereinafter Fox, Retaining
Mandatory Securities Disclosure] (explaining that before 1933, both the quantity and the
quality of disclosures between issuers varied considerably, making comparisons between
firms impossible); Samuel W. Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 570 (2011)
(observing than an effective system of disclosure must make disclosures mandatory and
uniform).
29
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act prohibits the use of “any manipulative or deceptive
device” in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. It authorizes the SEC to
develop more specific rules about prohibited activities, as necessary “in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.” The SEC adopted Rule 10b–5 in which exercised its statutory
authority to the fullest, prohibiting not only false statements of fact or omissions that make
truthful affirmative statements misleading, but also schemes or artifices to defraud, and acts or
practices that operate as frauds or deceits. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b–5. This Article focuses on false
disclosures, not inaccurate stock prices that result from all three types of securities fraud.
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important, or material in securities regulation parlance, and the materiality is
measured by the significance of the misrepresentation to a reasonable
investor.30
In addition, the misrepresentation (or omission) must be related to a
purchase or sale of securities. A firm may be held liable for securities fraud
even if the purpose of the misleading statement was not to influence
investors, but its customers, employees, or others, and even if defendants did
not envision that investors would rely on the statement—only that a material
misstatement was disseminated in a medium on which investors could rely.31
Finally, securities laws prohibit not only fraudulent misrepresentations,
but hold issuers and insiders liable for reckless, and in some cases negligent
or innocent misrepresentations.32 The securities acts distinguish between
issuer transactions or primary offerings, in which the firm offers new
securities to investors, and trading or secondary market transactions in the
firm’s securities between two investors. Innocent material financial
misrepresentations must be corrected, or restated.33 In addition, innocent
misrepresentations made during a primary offering expose the issuer itself to
liability, but do not subject the issuer to fines or other sanctions. Negligent
misrepresentations in primary offerings expose those involved in the
offering, including the issuer’s officers, directors, underwriters, accountants,
to both, liability and sanctions.34 Reckless or fraudulent misrepresentations
expose firms and their agents to liability even when the firm does not benefit
from fraud directly by selling overpriced securities, but merely discloses
materially misleading information that leads its shareholders to trade.35

30

For the most recent elaboration of the principle of materiality see Matrixx Initiatives v.
Siracusano, 131 S.Ct. 1309 (2011) (quoting the standard as “a substantial likelihood that the
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available”).
31
Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that acquirer
shareholders could rely on statements made in a tender offer to target shareholders); In re
Carter-Wallace Sec. Litig., 150 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that an advertisement in a
medical journal is made “in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities).
32
In a fine recent article Samuel Buell explores the many different mental states that the
courts have upheld as sufficient for establishing “securities fraud,” from requiring a showing
of specific intent to defraud to mere lack of due care. See Buell, supra note 29, at 556–57.
33
The SEC requires firms to disclose within four business days that prior financial
statements should no longer be relied on by filing Form 8–K, followed by a restatement in a
periodic or amended filing (i.e., annual report on Form 10–K or quarterly report on Form 10–
Q). About 40 percent of all restatements are stealthy, revealed in a periodic report without a
prior disclosure in Item 4.02 of a Form 8–K.
34
See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 17, 15 U.S.C. §§77k, q (2011).
35
That is misrepresentation of a known fact made with the purpose to mislead. United
States v. Piepgrass, 425 F.2d 194, 199–200 (9th Cir. 1970); Rice v. United States, 149 F.2d
601, 603 (10th Cir. 1945).
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Securities laws authorize public agencies (i.e., the SEC, federal
prosecutors), self-regulatory organizations (i.e., FINRA), and defrauded
shareholders, who are considered the victims of misrepresentations, to
enforce disclosure violations.36 While shareholders can only seek damages,
other enforcement agents can seek a variety of remedies, from injunctions,
disgorgements, and fines, to prison.
Two recent amendments to securities laws, in particular the SarbanesOxley Act, and to a much lesser extent the Dodd-Frank Act, departed from
the shareholder-centric approach.37 They imposed a mix of corporate
governance and compliance requirements that were designed to improve the
accuracy of disclosures and reduce the temptation of fraudulent disclosures.
These include enhanced auditing and financial reporting, a ban on corporate
loans to executives that might tempt them to cheat, increased reliance on
independent directors as monitors, and whistleblower incentives.
B. Existing Thought on the Harm From Securities Fraud
Congress adopted the securities acts in the 1930s with two goals in mind:
to protect investors, who “were unfairly robbed of their investments during
the stock market collapse of 1929,”38 and to further the public interest by
preventing securities fraud and manipulation, which “precipitate, intensify,
and prolong” “[n]ational emergencies, which produce widespread
unemployment and . . . affect the general welfare.”39
Since then, courts and commentators have settled on a narrower
understanding of who is harmed by securities fraud: securities markets.40 The
36

For a discussion of the comparative advantages of different enforcers of securities
violations, see James M. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce Securities
Laws, 100 CAL. L. REV. 115 (2012).
37
Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV.
1817, 1828–33 (2007) [hereinafter Langevoort, Social Construction] (arguing that the Act’s
provisions were animated by the desire to make public companies publicly accountable).
38
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 941 (1998).
39
Section 2 of the Securities Exchange Act talks about manipulation, excessive
speculation and “sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices,” which has led some
to argue that the Act was concerned primarily with manipulation and integrity of stock prices,
not with “full and honest disclosure or the importance of information about issuers.” Steve
Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 385, 391–92 (1990). But surely, the Act as it has subsequently been applied by the
Supreme Court is not unconcerned with misleading disclosures.
40
The courts have identified at least eight separate policies underlying the rule against
securities fraud: “(1) maintaining free securities markets; (2) equalizing access to information;
(3) insuring equal bargaining strength; (4) providing for disclosure; (5) protecting investors;
(6) assuring fairness; (7) building investor confidence; and (8) deterring violations while
compensating victims.” 5B ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE
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general consensus posits that material misreporting, the most common
variant of securities fraud,41 harms securities markets in three ways. First,
misreporting in both primary offering and secondary market transactions
transfers value from public investors to insiders: in the former by overpriced
newly-issued securities and in the latter by insider trading.42 That transfer is
not costless.43 Drawing an analogy with common law fraud, a number of
commentators and courts have accepted that the net social cost of securities
fraud is the value transferred from public investors to insiders.44
The involuntary transfer of value affects how investors behave.
Burglaries lead people to take precautions, including buying heavier locks,
handguns, or safe deposit boxes, all of which are direct costs, and to reduce
their willingness to buy expensive jewelry in the first place, an opportunity
cost.45 Similarly, because of securities fraud, investors spend resources trying
to verify the truthfulness of disclosures before investing. Some investors
might stay away from equity markets for fear that they would lose
systematically to better informed traders and insiders, thereby marginally
reducing securities market liquidity and increasing the cost of assembling

SECURITIES LAWS § 6:4, at 6–13 (2011). Professor Miriam Baer recently observed that “most
commentators would agree, [that] fraud is bad for the securities markets.” Miriam H. Baer,
Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1076 (2008).
41
See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS 2011: A YEAR IN
REVIEW 28 fig.26 (2012), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_
research/2011_YIR/ Cornerstone_Research_Filings_2011_YIR.pdf/ (reporting that 94% of
class actions filed in 2011 alleged misrepresentations in financial documents, a percentage that
has remained stable over the years).
42
There is evidence that crooked managers reduce their stockholdings while cooking the
books. See e.g., Simi Kedia & Thomas Philippon, The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting,
22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2169, 2170 & Fig.1 (2009) (noting that Enron insiders sold millions of
dollars worth of Enron stock while fraud was ongoing).
43
A transfer of value from one party to another is not a social cost per se. But, a zero-cost
transfer assumes perfect competition, information, substitution, and rationality, as well as zero
transaction costs. When these assumptions are relaxed, as they must be, all transfers will
produce social deadweight losses.
44
See Seibel v. Scott, 725 F.2d 995, 1002 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3515 (1984);
Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 787 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). See also
Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1487, 1498 (“Aggregate class trading losses are probably greater than either the true net social
cost of the violation or the benefits received by the violator, both of which are speculative in
nature and difficult to calculate.”); Adam C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v.
Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy of Securities Class Actions, 2007–08 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 217, 219 (arguing that disgorgement of unlawful gains is the right measure of damages
for securities fraud because it approximates the social costs of fraud).
45
See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 207 (1968) (arguing that the largest element of the social cost of crime is spent on
precaution).
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and maintaining a diversified portfolio of securities.46 Both effects depress
the price that investors are willing to pay for newly-issued and existing
securities, thereby increasing the cost of new capital for firms and reducing
returns for existing investors.
Second, managers and insiders benefit from false disclosures.47 To
reduce their incentive to lie (or to look the other way), enforcement is
necessary to confront the malefactors with the cost of their violation.48
Enforcements costs—the cost of unmasking the offense, conducting an
internal and external investigation, and litigating about offenses49—are
substantial.
Third and finally, misrepresentations tend to inflate stock prices and thus
upset the allocation of economic resources through two separate
mechanisms. In an ideal society, all projects would be rank-ordered based on
their risk-adjusted expected returns. Assuming that capital is scarce, not all
projects can be funded. Fraudulent firms attract capital and overinvest in
low-yield projects, while honest firms cannot fund good projects.50 The
misallocation of capital reduces returns on equity investment and a
deadweight loss to society from having foregone superior projects.51
In addition, stock prices are used as a yardstick for managerial
compensation and retention. Professors Jennifer Arlen and Bill Carney were
the first to observe that managers commit fraud when they fear that but for
the false disclosure, they would be fired. Inaccurate disclosures mask poor
performance and prevent value-enhancing changes in management.52 In
46

Richard A. Posner, Law and the Theory of Finance: Some Intersections, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 159, 170 (1986); Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of
“Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1042 (1992).
47
A misrepresentation in a registration statement prepared for a primary offering yields
an immediate and direct benefit to the firm as investors overpay for securities that the firm and
its insiders sell. A misrepresentation in a firm’s periodic disclosure produces a less direct and
usually smaller benefit to the firm because the firm does not capture the entire increase in its
stock price, though it enables the firm to make cheap acquisitions using its own stock, or
negotiate better loan terms. See e.g., Cenco v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 451 (7th
Cir. 1982) (listing cheap acquisitions and lower borrowing costs among the benefits to the
firm from fraudulent disclosure).
48
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 349–50 (1972). It is irrelevant
from the social welfare standpoint whether the violator pays the cost to the victims or into
state coffers. Id.
49
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 623 (1985).
50
Kahan, supra note 47, at 1010; Tracy Yue Wang, Corporate Securities Fraud: An
Economic Analysis 16–18 (Apr. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=500562/ [hereinafter Wang, Economic Analysis] (explaining the
dynamic theoretically).
51
Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure, supra note 29, at 1358.
52
Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 740 & n.71 (1992). Note that the
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addition, knowing that sanctions follow discovery, managers of fraudulent
firms spend resources trying to conceal fraud and avoid punishment.53
Commentators have accepted and assumed that shareholders are the ones
who bear the cost of impaired corporate governance.54
Notably missing from the existing debate are considerations of the cost
of financial misrepresentations to non-shareholder constituents. In an
influential treatise, Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel
suggested that, except for investors, all stakeholders can protect themselves
effectively by contract.55 Professor Ray Ball went further to suggest that
employees, in particular, benefit when a firm’s managers engage in financial
misreporting because misreporting delays business failure.56
Other commentators have left room for the possibility, albeit remote, that
widespread securities fraud could harm non-financial markets indirectly,57 or
that fraud by the largest firms could result in large social harm, but not fraud
by their smaller peers.58 But by and large, most commentators have
change can take place either by the existing board of directors, who can fire the manager and
find a better one, or by a different board, put in place after a change in control through a
takeover. See Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure, supra note 29, at 1364.
53
Posner, supra note 47, at 170; Qi Zhou, Contractual Mistake and Misrepresentation
41, in CONTRACT LAW AND ECONOMICS (Gerrit De Geest ed., 2011).
54
See e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities
Litigation, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 333 (contending that liability for securities fraud improves
corporate governance and that the beneficiaries include non-trading shareholders); Merritt B.
Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 WISC.
L. REV. 297 (noting that disclosure improves the allocation of scarce capital to highest value
projects and providing evidence that better disclosure affects the terms demanded by debtors);
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The "Innocent Shareholder": An Essay on Compensation and
Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 243 (arguing that
shareholders ultimately bear the cost of managerial malfeasance); Robert B. Thompson &
Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56
VAND. L. REV. 859 (2003).
55
See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 35–39 (1991) (observing that employees make firm-specific investments,
but arguing that non-shareholder groups can protect themselves adequately through contract);
Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment
of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 188–92 (same).
56
Ray Ball, Market and Political/Regulatory Perspectives on the Recent Accounting
Scandals, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 277, 298 (2009).
57
Kahan, supra note 47, at 1034–35 (explaining that fraud could precipitate a recession).
But see MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA J. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1867–1960 (1963) (arguing that misguided monetary policy caused the Great
Depression).
58
In a recent paper, Professors Langevoort and Thompson observed that accounting
frauds in WorldCom and Enron caused “immense pain to employees and retirees,” cost their
competitors billions of dollars, and severely distorted the regulated markets in which the two
firms operated. They suggested that the reason for the large social harm associated with the
fraud was the firms’ size, while financial manipulation at smaller firms produces harms that
are local and contained. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 7, at 44–45.
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dismissed the concern and concluded that the social welfare loss from the
misallocation of economic resources is “small, and for many offenses the
transfer of wealth [from shareholders to insiders] will be far and away the
largest element of the net harm.”59
The approach taken by the securities regulators has largely followed the
commentators’ lead. Shareholders, who act on the false disclosure and
change their position for the worse, are perceived as the primary victims of
securities fraud.60 The law gives them a private right of action for damages
and entitles them to the fair funds—disgorgements of wrongful profits and
civil fines that the SEC collects from securities violators.61
This narrow, injured-shareholder-centric understanding of the harm from
false disclosures suggests that false disclosures cause relatively little harm,
which has led lawmakers, regulators, the business community, and academic
commentators to express concerns about the cost of compliance and
overenforcement of fraud.62 Responding to the sentiment that the cost of
compliance had depressed job growth,63 Congress recently passed the JOBS
Act to allow newly-public companies to produce more limited disclosures

59
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 50, at 625. See also Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse
& Luigi Zingales, How Pervasive is Corporate Fraud? 17 (Aug. 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/adair.morse/research/pervasiveness_
aug2011.pdf/ [Dyck, Morse & Zingales, Pervasive Fraud] (observing that shareholders and
debt holders are harmed by fraud); Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud
in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 631, 633–34 (concluding that temporary
mispricing of a security leads to small allocative costs, because it is irrelevant for the
efficiency of capital markets who owns individual stocks).
60
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730–31 (1974) (affirming
the rule first adopted in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1952) that a
person who is neither a purchaser nor a seller of securities may not bring an action under
§10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act).
61
15 U.S.C. §7246(a).
62
See e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE CURRENT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM
OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 2 (Mar. 2006), available at
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/0603secenforcementstudy.pdf/ (suggesting that the SEC had adopted an “overly punitive approach to enforcement”); ABA
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE TASK FORCE, REPORT TO ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES ON
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 17 (2006) (arguing that civil and criminal enforcement actions against fraud
harmed firms, eroded individuals’ constitutional rights, and undermined the role of lawyers);
Charles E. Schumer & Michael R. Bloomberg, To Save New York, Learn from London, at
A18, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2006; Mahoney, supra note 60, at 623–24 (arguing that the fraudon-the-market doctrine overdeters voluntary disclosure by firms); ANJAN THAKOR, U.S.
CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF SECURITIES
LITIGATION
1
(2005),
available
at
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/
get_ilr_doc.php?docid=857/ (asserting that sanctions in securities fraud class actions
“overcompensate” investors).
63
Coates, supra note 24, at 5.
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than firms with a longer public tenure.64 The analysis and discussion in the
Parts that follow suggest that the rush to deregulate was premised on an
economically flawed assumption that investors bear the entire cost of
securities fraud. Once that assumption is relaxed, the rationale for
deregulation, as well as reforms designed to empower shareholders, largely
disappears.65
II.

OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS

This Article contends that fraudulent financial reporting generates
negative externalities to non-shareholders and that these externalities exceed
the losses suffered by defrauded shareholders by a significant margin.66
Fraudulent financial reporting impairs accurate risk assessment by
shareholders and non-shareholder constituents (i.e., creditors, employees,
suppliers, vendors, customers, communities), interferes with economic
learning by rivals, distorts real economic decisions that misreporting firms
and their honest peers make, and, on the margin, increases the risk that the
firm will shrink or fail after the misrepresentation is unmasked, in particular
if followed by an enforcement action. At the level of the overall economy,
fraudulent financial reporting misallocates capital and labor among firms,
producing social deadweight losses.
Securities fraud encompasses many different types of actions.67 This
Article focuses on financial misrepresentations.68 They are not only the most
common species in the menagerie of securities fraud,69 but also tend to be
64
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act §§ 101–107, Pub. L. No. 112–106, 126 Stat. 306
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (providing for reduced disclosure and audit
requirements for “emerging growth companies”).
65
For example, the Dodd-Frank Act grants shareholders the right to vote on executive
compensation. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 12, at § 951.
66
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
67
See Buell, supra note 29, at 556–57 (describing the various meanings of “securities
fraud”).
68
Financial misrepresentations come in many shapes and sizes. Some require a
restatement of previously released financial statements, others do not. Not all restatements
suggest fraud, though eighty percent of restatements between 1997 and 2002 were negative.
Kedia & Phillipon, supra note 43, at 2178. Not all accounting frauds are followed by a
restatement. Dyck, Morse & Zingales, Pervasive Fraud, supra note 60, at 32–33 (estimating
that 38 percent of caught frauds do not require a restatement, such as disclosures of half-truths
or misleading forward-looking information). Even where a restatement would have been
required, some firms do not survive long enough to file a restatement (e.g., Enron), some
ignore the SEC’s instruction to file a restatement, and some take a one-time accounting charge
in lieu of filing a restatement. See Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The
Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 585 & n.9
(2008).
69
See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 42, at 28 fig.26.
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particularly harmful for the firm’s constituents and its rivals. The Part begins
with an overview of why managers misrepresent their firm’s financial
performance, how misrepresentations distort economic decision-making, and
how common is accounting fraud.
A. The Anatomy of a Misrepresentation
A rational manager might commit or conceal fraud when he believes that
his personal gain exceeds the impact he would suffer if fraud was unmasked,
discounted by the likelihood of detection. The most common reason that
managers release false disclosures appears to be their desire to disguise
disappointing performance.70 Managers face a lot of pressure to meet
performance expectations: performance-based compensation, avoiding
termination, increasing the odds of promotion, avoiding the downgrade in the
firm’s debt or the violation of debt covenants, averting employee exodus.
They know that stock prices of firms that miss even a single earnings target
decline substantially, and fear that their job and reputation might be on the
line. They might be concerned that creditors will cancel a line of credit and
employees flee to other firms, pushing the firm over the brink if they reveal
the truth. In particular when managers wishfully think that the shortfall is
only temporary and that real performance will soon improve, the temptation
to overstate earnings may be hard to resist.71 Concealing bad news buys
time.72
In other cases, managers misreport their company’s performance because
of greed: the structure of managerial compensation provides supercharged

70
Arlen & Carney, supra note 53, at 701. Even in the largest frauds, managers rarely set
out to commit the fraud that ultimately results. When performance disappoints, managers
usually exhaust legal option before resorting to those that are illegal. See Patricia M. Dechow,
Weili Ge, Chad R. Larson & Richard G. Sloan, Predicting Material Accounting
Misstatements, 28 CONTEMPORARY ACCT. RES. 17, 19 (2011). As Professor Don Langevoort
and others have suggested, managers usually begin by manipulating “just a little,” perhaps to
cover a temporary blip in performance, and hope that they can smooth over the manipulation
in the next period. When the next period fails to bring good news, the slippery slope leads
managers to ever greater manipulation. See Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate
Thermostat, Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals about Self-Deception, Deceiving
others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 308 (2004); Michael Guttentag,
Stumbling Into Crime: Stochastic Process Models of Accounting Fraud, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW (A. Harel & K. Hylton, eds. 2011).
71
Arlen & Carney, supra note 53, at 702–03 (identifying the “last period” problem as an
important cause of accounting fraud); Dechow et al., supra note 71, at 19 (finding that alleged
fraudulent firms had strong performance before the misrepresentation, and that true
performance declined during periods of fraud).
72
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 106 (2011) [hereinafter Bratton & Wachter, FOTM].
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incentives for fraud. They overstate the firm’s financials to inflate the stock
price, exercise their stock options, and pocket millions of dollars.73
Whatever the reason for the misrepresentation, all frauds are alike: the
manager releases misleading information about the firm’s financial
performance. That statement is usually accompanied by similarly misleading
public pronouncements.74 To avoid detection, communications with the
investment community as well as the firm’s stakeholders must match the
fraudulent financial disclosure. In addition, the manager must change the
firm’s real actions to conform to its reported financial health.75 Managers
might sell output at a loss, announce new projects, overinvest in fixed assets,
and overhire.76 To better mask fraud, managers might choose projects with
higher cash-flow volatility (i.e., “lottery tickets”) or projects whose returns
are not correlated with existing investments.77 They lie to their accountants,78
and even pay taxes on non-existent earnings.79
Unless and until fraud is discovered, it benefits the manager, as well as
the firm’s current shareholders. The fraudulent firm can make cheap stockfor-stock acquisitions using its overpriced equity, negotiate better loan terms
as a result of its perceived lower risk, and hire more talented workers, excited

73

See Adam C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions
With Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 932–34 (1999)
[hereinafter Pritchard, Markets as Monitors] (arguing that greed can induce managers to
commit accounting fraud).
74
See Stephen P. Baginski, Sean McGuire, Nathan Sharp & Brady Twedt, To Tell the
Truth: Management Forecasts in Periods of Accounting Fraud 1 (July 2011) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://jindal.utdallas.edu/som/files/BMST_FraudMcGuire_UTD_Presentation.pdf/ (finding that managers issue pessimistic forecasts during
periods of accounting fraud and manipulate the firm’s earnings to meet or beat them).
Professor Wang suggests that the reason for releasing pessimistic forecasts is that failing to
meet performance expectations increases the probability that fraud will be detected because
disappointed investors might begin an external investigation. Tracy Yue Wang, Corporate
Securities Fraud: Insights From a New Empirical Framework, J.L. ECON. & ORG.
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=561425/.
75
See Sadka, supra note 4, at 447 (observing that managers will change their business
decisions to conceal fraud, but only if fraud itself is punished).
76
See id. at 439, 457–58.
77
See Wang, Economic Analysis, supra note 51, at 14.
78
See e.g., BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 128, 157–58 (2003) (describing examples of
deals where Enron executives misrepresented facts to its accountants, Arthur Andersen).
79
See Merle Erickson, Michelle Hanlon & Edward Maydew, How Much Will Firms Pay
for Earnings That Do Not Exist? Evidence of Taxes Paid on Allegedly Fraudulent Earnings,
79 ACCT. REV. 387, 389–90 (2004) (reporting that out of 27 firms subject to SEC enforcement
actions during the studied period, 15 paid taxes on overstated earnings; the total amount of
taxes paid represented 2.4% of the firms’ market value and 20% of the pretax value of
overstated earnings).
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about the firm’s bright future.80 The beneficiaries also include those who sell
the firm’s stock and debt in the secondary markets during fraud.81
A misrepresentation communicates to those who contract with the firm
that the firm’s financial health is better than it really is, that the firm poses a
low credit risk and is less likely to terminate employees. Fraudulent
disclosures also interfere with other firms’ ability to understand the markets
in which they operate. Firms’ managers and directors do not know ex ante
which business strategy is optimal and so they look to their rivals as gauges
of what the market wants. Significant misreporting impairs rivals’ ability to
discern the value of new investments and may lead an entire industry may
adopt a misguided business strategy.82
There is evidence that earnings manipulation is very common, and that
many frauds are never detected.83 Estimated detection rates vary from as high
as 100 percent to as low as 2.39 percent.84 In a recent study, Professors
Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse and Luigi Zingales suggest that about 75
percent of significant frauds are never caught.85 They found that, in any
given year, 1.3 percent of firms that are ultimately caught begin
misreporting, and 3.2 percent have ongoing fraud.86 Extrapolating from other
evidence the authors estimated that between 11.2 and 13.2 percent of firms
are manipulating their earnings.87
B. If and After the Truth Is Revealed

80

See Cenco v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 451 (7th Cir. 1982).
For example, Enron’s Lou Pai left the firm early in 2001 with $250 million in Enron
stock and stock options. As a result of a divorce settlement, he sold his holdings in May and
June 2001, a mere six months before Enron filed for bankruptcy. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra
note 79, at 124.
82
Abigail Brown & Simon D. Angus, Destroying Creative Destruction: The Social
Welfare Cost of Fraud 4–5 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://abigailbrown.files.wordpress.com/2009/08/non-anon1.pdf/. See generally Richard R.
Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, Evolutionary Theorizing in Economics, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring
2002, at 23 (explaining evolutionary economics and comparing it with neoclassical
assumptions).
83
Joseph Gerakos & Andrei Kovrijnykh, Reporting Bias and Economic Shocks (Univ. of
Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 10–12, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1546478/ (finding that, on average, 17–20% of firms with sufficient data on
COMPUSTAT exhibit significant earnings manipulation).
84
Artur Filipe Ewald Wuerges & Jose Alonso Borba, Accounting Fraud Detection: Is it
Possible to Quantify Undiscovered Cases? 1 (Dec. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1718652/.
85
Dyck, Morse & Zingales, Pervasive Fraud, supra note 60, at 5.
86
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act significantly reduced the number of detected
frauds, from a high in 2001 when 5.3 percent of firms were committing fraud, to a post-SOX
low of 1.3 percent in 2004. Id.
87
Dyck, Morse & Zingales, Pervasive Fraud, supra note 60, at 11.
81
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Empirical studies suggest that exposing fraudulent financial reporting is
very costly for firms. About a third of the firms that are targets of SEC
enforcement actions for misreporting file for bankruptcy.88 Because many
firms that cooked their books were financially stressed beforehand, some
number would have filed for bankruptcy anyway.89 But, many could have
avoided bankruptcy in the absence of fraud, or alternately, would have filed
for bankruptcy protection earlier, before things deteriorated beyond repair.90
A number of studies have found that a substantial percentage of firms, if not
the majority, were financially healthy in the period before the financial
manipulation.91 During fraud, that performance deteriorates, and managers’
costly efforts to avoid detection make things worse.
Estimating how many bankruptcies are caused by accounting fraud is
difficult, but empirical evidence suggests that the number might be relatively
high. Professors Karpoff, Martin, and Lee have found that being caught for
accounting fraud is very costly for firms.92 Having studied all cases of
financial misreporting that were subject to SEC and DOJ enforcement
actions between 1978 and 2002, they found that for every dollar in increased
market value due to fraudulent disclosure, the firm lost that dollar after
unmasking of fraud, and an additional $3.08 ($3.83 for firms that did not file
88
See COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION,
MARK BEASLEY AT AL., FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 1998–2007: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S.
PUBLIC COMPANIES 40 & Tbl. 28 (2010) [hereinafter COSO STUDY] (reporting that 28% of the
firms subject to an AAER between 1998 and 2007 filed for bankruptcy within two years);
Karpoff, Lee & Martin, supra note 69, at 593 (reporting that 34% of firms subject to an SEC
or Department of Justice enforcement action between 1978 and 2002 filed for bankruptcy).
89
See COSO STUDY, supra note 89, at 11 (reporting that the median net income of a
fraudulent firm was $875,000, while the 25th percentile firms faced net losses of $2.1 million).
90
Not all fraud-induced bankruptcies result in liquidation. Rather, the business
reorganizes, mitigating the harm of bankruptcy to the stakeholders (as well as the
shareholders, who often receive an equity slice in the reorganized firm). See UCLA–LoPucki
Bankruptcy Research Database, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/study_results.asp/ (suggesting that
most fraud-induced bankruptcies resulted with a confirmed Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization). The presence of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan, however, overstates the number
of fraudulent firms that survived bankruptcy. Enron emerged with a confirmed Chapter 11
plan, but the sole purpose of the surviving entity, Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., is to
liquidate Enron’s assets for the benefit of its creditors. See Enron Creditors Recovery Corp.,
About ECRC, http://www.enron.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1&
Itemid=9/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2012).
91
A 2010 study prepared by the Treadway Commission reported that a quarter of the
firms subject to an SEC enforcement action for financial manipulation between 1998 and 2007
reported net income of over $18 million in the quarter before they began manipulating their
earnings, while the highest net income firm in the sample reported almost $8.9 billion. COSO
STUDY, supra note 89, at 11. Another study found that 25 percent of bankrupt companies with
revenues over $1 billion were subject to an SEC enforcement action. DELOITTE FORENSIC
CENTER, TEN THINGS ABOUT BANKRUTPCY AND FRAUD: A REVIEW OF BANKRUPTCY FILINGS 9
(2008), available at http://www.bankruptcyfraud.typepad.com/Deloitte Report.pdf/.
92
Karpoff, Lee & Martin, supra note 69, at 581.
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for bankruptcy).93 Of that additional loss, only 36 cents (or 8.8%) was due to
expected legal penalties, while $2.71 was what they call lost “reputation.”94
Some part of the “reputational loss” reflects the cost of conducting an
internal investigation, defending the firm in litigation, and collateral
consequences of the enforcement action, such as the loss of government
contracts.95 A part reflects the “exodus of current customers and employees,”
the firm’s expected lower sales,96 and higher cost of contracting and
financing.97
Professors Dyck, Morse, and Zingales looked instead at the reduction in
the value of the enterprise, measured by sales and assets. After adjusting for
the fact that firms commit fraud to hide bad news, they found that accounting
fraud destroys about 40 percent of firm value.98
In addition, disclosing fraud usually produces a sudden and significant
shock to the firm, and the very suddenness is costly by itself, in particular to
those firm constituents, such as employees, who have open-term and implicit
contracts, and cannot exit quickly and cheaply.99
Even those fraudulent firms that avoid bankruptcy often suffer other
significant consequences: many delist (47% compared with 20% for nonfraud firms over a 10-year period) and are twice as likely as their honest
peers to engage in material asset sales (63% vs. 31%).100
Undiscovered fraud and its cost are largely invisible. We do not know
whether undiscovered frauds are similar to discovered frauds or different in
important respects, including their duration. It is possible that hidden
earnings manipulation averts or delays some bankruptcies, by diverting
capital and labor to fraudulent firms. But honest firms, from whom resources
have been diverted, cannot go ahead with worthwhile projects. In addition,
actions that managers take to conceal fraud are costly in and of themselves,
and often very risky. It thus seems highly unlikely that undetected
93

Id.
Id.
95
See Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence 8–9, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW (Keith Hylton & Alon Harel, eds., forthcoming);
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Baer, supra note 41, at 1062.
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Sudheer Chava, Kershen Huang & Shane A. Johnson, Why Won’t You Forgive Me?
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As one commentator observed, Enron, seventh on the 2001 Fortune 500 list by
revenues, melted down “abruptly, essentially without warning.” JOEL SELIGMAN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 728 (3d ed. 2003).
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COSO STUDY, supra note 89, at 40.
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accounting fraud would on net benefit employees or creditors.101 There is no
doubt that hidden fraud harms rivals, who adopt misguided strategies and
invest in low-return projects based on projections informed by accounting
misrepresentations of their peers.
III. FINANCIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS AND INTRA-FIRM COST
The nexus of contracts theory, which has been fantastically influential in
shaping U.S. corporate law and securities regulation, assumes that the firm is
a team of inputs, organized under a net of related contractual
arrangements.102 The contracts require the firm to pay claimants fixed
amounts, except the shareholders, whose claims are variable and depend on
the residual value of the enterprise: the firm’s profits.103 The value of an
investment in stock depends entirely on the estimates of profits the firm
might generate in the future. Insiders, usually managers, can manipulate
these estimates by releasing false but credible information. Fraudulent
disclosures inflate the stock price, while eventual exposure of fraud returns
the price to the correct level (reflecting fundamentals), which is what the
price would have been absent fraud.104 Sellers win, buyers lose, and those
who hold on are unaffected by fraud.105
The neoclassical theory predicts that fixed claimants are also unaffected
by false disclosures and securities fraud, because their claims are, by
definition, fixed. The conclusion is premised on four assumptions. First,
market competition determines the conditions under which fixed claimants,
101
Experimental studies suggest that fraud increases the cost of capital for honest firms,
causing them to forego profitable new projects or abandon current ones. Oren Bar–Gill &
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Misreporting Corporate Performance 24 (Harv. L. & Econ. Discussion,
Paper No. 400, 2002) (on file with author).
102
See e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and
Economic Organization 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 794 (1972); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,
3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (integrating “elements from the theory of agency, the theory of
property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the
firm”).
103
See Macey, supra note 56, at 180.
104
See e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 50, at 635.
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THAKOR, supra note 63, at 4 (suggesting that investors who held stock in the
fraudulent firm during the fraud period were “undamaged” by the fraud). Relying on work by
Jonathan Karpoff, Professor Arlen has made the point that shareholders in the fraudulent firm
who did not trade during the fraud are not indifferent to accounting fraud. They are worse off
than they would be absent fraud, and often much worse off, even if the firm never pays
damages or fines. Even if fraud-tainted sales offset fraud-tainted purchases ex post, and
shareholders have bought shares at a discount reflecting the systemic risk of securities fraud,
shareholders would nonetheless prefer that fewer firms commit fraud. See Arlen, supra note
96, at 8.
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including employees, creditors, suppliers, and customers, enter into contracts
with the firm. Employees’ or suppliers’ investment is generally not at risk,
because they are paid the market rate for their services or goods. In a
competitive market, employees and suppliers can find substitute jobs or
contractual partners quickly and at no or low cost. Second, if their
investment is at risk, such as long-term loans or firm-specific investments,
they can accurately assess the risk ex ante and demand compensation by
contract. They can specify by contract what information they relied on when
negotiating the risk-premium, and, if the information turns out to have been
misrepresented, they can be compensated ex post by holding the firm liable.
Third, association with the fraudulent firm has no reputational effect on
future contracts. And fourth and finally, if a firm fails or shrinks as a result of
its managers’ fraudulent disclosures, rivals will immediately and costlessly
acquire the fraudulent firm’s market share, hire its laid-off employees and
take over its contracts with suppliers. The following sections explain why
and to what extent these assumptions hold for two groups of fixed claimants:
creditors and employees.
A. Intra-Firm Cost: Theory
1. Creditors
Declining value of collateral is the primary risk for secured lenders, and
is often uncorrelated with the debtor’s business prospects. Unsecured
lenders, on the other hand, face two risks correlated with the debtor’s
performance: (1) that business will deteriorate, and (2) that the debtor will
incur additional debt.
Banks and financial institutions use contract to mitigate the risk of
default. They demand a higher interest rate when the risk of business failure
is higher, but the rate alone does not prevent the debtor from borrowing more
afterwards.106 Banks include loan covenants in the contract—for example, a
leverage ratio ceiling—that allow the banks to declare default and demand
immediate repayment if a covenant is violated. To facilitate the exercise of
their contractual rights, banks require the debtor firm to supply its financial
statements periodically and to notify the bank of any covenant violations. If
the debtor fails to do so, or if it misrepresents its financial position at the
time of borrowing, it is liable to the bank for its failure. Like equity
investors, banks diversify their firm-specific risk by lending to many
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Leveraged buyouts are an example of opportunistic borrowing. During the buyout, the
firm borrows a massive amount of debt at a high interest rate, but does not eliminate its prior
debt that was priced for a firm that was much less risky.

2013]

THE COST OF SECURITIES FRAUD - DRAFT

23

different borrowers and by syndicating large loans. They remain exposed to
market risk of fraud, but demand a fraud premium as ex ante compensation.
Institutional creditors fit the nexus theory of fixed claimants well.107
However, credit risk is relevant in agreements other than the traditional bank
loan. Trade creditors—suppliers and vendors—are exposed to the risk of
default. Unlike banks and institutional lenders, trade creditors do not
specialize in managing credit risk. They also cannot eliminate the risk of
fraud by as effectively as banks through diversification: they are exposed to
the ups and downs of their industry. Finally, there are few economies of scale
in monitoring counterparty credit risk. It is as costly for a supplier holding a
$100,000 account receivable to monitor the buyer as it is for a lender with a
$10 million loan.
Instead of detailed contracts, trade creditors rely more heavily on exit.
They deliver supplies in batches, requiring payment periodically and
frequently. If the buyer does not pay, a supplier will stop supplying the
materials. A misrepresentation of the firm’s performance impedes accurate
assessment of the firm’s creditworthiness and its liquidation value.108 But the
amount at risk is relatively small, assuming that a supplier can easily and
cheaply replace the lost business from the fraudulent firm if it fails.
2. Employees
Valuation methods for financial investments are equally useful to assess
the value of employees’ human capital investment. The value of human
capital is the net present value of future income streams from work. In a
perfectly competitive labor market, where employees have made no firmspecific investments, salaries across firms are driven to their competitive
floor. If employees can switch jobs quickly and at no cost, if none of their
pay has been deferred, if working for a fraudulent firm does not impair their
earning potential, and if the existence of misreporting has no impact on
overall economic growth and employment levels, employees are indifferent
to securities fraud in any firm: the value of their human capital is unaffected.
But all these assumptions must be relaxed and that has a profound impact
on the cost of financial misreporting to employees. First, employees are often
their employer’s creditors because they are promised contingent or deferred
compensation. Contingent compensation usually conditional on the
employee’s own and the firm’s performance, such as a year-end bonus.
When the firm does poorly, it might pay no bonuses, even to its most
107

But, as Professor Coffee has noted, there are many ways for managers to increase risk
that real-life contracts cannot control. Coffee, Shareholders vs. Managers, supra note 9, at 69.
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Dragon Yongjun Tang, Feng Tian & Hong Yan, Creditors’ Expected Recovery and
Internal Control Quality: Evidence From Credit Default Swaps 1 (Mar. 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2023112/.
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productive employees. Deferred compensation, such as a company pension
or severance, are at risk if the firm performs poorly. Second, many jobs
require employees to develop firm-specific skills, including good working
relationships with co-workers, that are lost if the employee is terminated.109
Third, labor is comparatively much more specialized than capital.
Specialized, or non-homogenous markets have fewer buyers, and so it
necessarily takes an employee longer to find acceptable substitute
employment than it takes a shareholder to cash out.110 Quick terminations
that usually follow revelations of accounting fraud lead to periods of
unemployment or force employees into accepting lower paying jobs—costs
employees could have avoided if they had warning of the firm’s declining
business prospects. The cost of exit increases if employees have made
personal decisions in reliance on retaining the job, like buying a house.111
Finally, and most importantly, employees cannot diversify away the
firm-specific risk of failure or fraud. For most workers, human capital
constitutes a large percentage of their wealth, so the loss is substantial, even
if the displacement is only temporary.112
There is little reason to believe that workers can use contracts to protect
against firm failure and/or fraud effectively, for structural and informational
reasons.113 Employers do not know whether the employee is likely to be
productive at the time of hiring.114 They rationally screen for “difficult”
employees, including those who might try to negotiate too hard. Except for
top executive employment contracts, there is little evidence that employees
could negotiate contractual provisions other than perhaps pay.
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Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297, 299
(1978). Employees who develop firm-specific skills are usually paid a quasi-rent for making
the investment, but the payment is deferred and paid either as a higher salary or as severance.
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Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud Protection in the Labor
Market, 107 YALE L. J. 715, 749 (1997) [Greenfield, Unjustified Absence] (noting that the
“exit option” for workers is much more costly than it is for capital). Charles Schwab charges
individual investors $8.95 for online trades. Charles Schwab, Fees & Commissions,
http://www.schwab-global.com/public/schwab-gcben/what_we_offer/independent_investing/fees_and_ commissions.html/ (last visited June 26,
2012).
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Greenfield, Unjustified Absence, supra note 111, at 719 (noting that companies seek
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Daniel R. Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared With Capital Markets
and Corporate Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1061, 1068 (1984).
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But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993) (suggesting that
employees can protect their interests either contractually or through regulatory pressure).
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Interviews continue to be used in hiring, although they are poor predictors of
subsequent employee performance.
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Informational asymmetries abound—it is nearly impossible for
employees to verify at the time of hiring if the firm’s managers are honest. In
addition, at-will employment is entrenched in the American labor market, but
most employees and employers act as if employment is long-term.115 But
because the term of employment is open, employees have no redress for
early termination. Collective bargaining could mitigate contracting problems
but unions “are in a period of historical weakness.”116
Instead, employees rely on exit. Accurate and timely information about
the firm’s performance and viability is crucial to assessing whether the
expected risk-adjusted revenue stream from their current employer (minus
the cost of exit) exceeds the opportunity cost, and whether and when the
employee should start looking for a new job. Employees certainly rely on
internal sources of information, including rumors and office gossip, to assess
the firm’s likely future performance, but anecdotal evidence suggests that
they also rely on the firm’s securities disclosures and the stock price itself.117
The larger the firm, the less complete and reliable the internal sources of
information (perhaps with the exception of the firm’s top management and
its internal audit group), and the more useful are the firm’s securities
disclosures and communications by top management for employees’ own
assessment of their likely returns from continued employment with the firm.
Concealing the firm’s decline upends employees’ ability to decide that it
is time to quit because fraud credibly conveys to employees that the firm is
doing better than it really is.118 Dishonest managers are aware of the risk of
flight and try to reassure their workers, just as they reassure providers of
capital: they sell the lie to mask fraud and to prevent employee exodus.119
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Median employee tenure with current employer in 2010 was 4.4 years. U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., EMPLOYEE TENURE SUMMARY, Sept. 14, 2010,
http://www.bls.gov/ news.release/tenure.nr0.htm/.
116
Greenfield, Unjustified Absence, supra note 111, at 752. Only 6.9 percent of private
sector workers were unionized in 2010. Overall union membership has been on the decline
since the Bureau of Labor Statistics started collecting information in 1983. See U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., UNION MEMBERS—2010, Jan. 21, 2011.
117
See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 79, at 97 (noting that employees’ elevators at
Enron constantly displayed the current stock price).
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See Greenfield, Unjustified Absence, supra note 111, at 739–40 (explaining the
relationship between job security and pay). Of course, employees complicit in the scheme do
not rely on the false financial picture of the firm’s health.
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See Faith K. Stevelman, Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron,
Financial Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1579, 1596 (2002) (“Lay
reassured employees about the positive financial prospects of the firm and even suggested that
they would benefit from purchasing more Enron stock.”). See also Greenfield, Unjustified
Absence, supra note 111, at 718–19, 721 & n.26 (recounting numerous stories of employer
fraud, usually featuring managers who reassured workers that the firm was profitable to
prevent flight, even though they planned to shut down the factory).
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When managers are caught manipulating a firm’s earnings, firms often
unravel quickly (certainly more quickly than most business failures),
exposing employees to sudden unemployment. If they knew the truth about
the firm, employees would have looked for work sooner and avoided
joblessness. Accounting fraud also harms employees’ reputations, and not
just those of fraudsters. At least anecdotally, even innocent employees of
Enron and Arthur Andersen, Enron’s auditor, reported being “mocked,
criticized, and not trusted,” in addition to being unemployed.120 Finally,
when firms shed many employees simultaneously, that extra supply will
depress wages, at least locally.
One might argue, as did Professor Ball, that fraud benefits employees
because it delays business failure, assuming that failure was inevitable.121
But fraud only benefits employees if the difference between their salary at
the fraudulent firm during delay, and their opportunity cost (i.e., alternative
job), exceeds the expected cost of fraud-induced delay and the reputational
harm.122 If bankruptcy is delayed, management might squander more money
that otherwise would have been available to pay severance. Delay might
increase the odds of liquidation over reorganization and result in greater job
losses overall. The job market might deteriorate in the interim. Finally, if
managers choose fraud, there is a non-zero possibility that fraud will
ultimately be unmasked and the firm will “implode in a wave of accounting
scandals” and harm employees’ reputations.123
But hidden fraud also harms employees. Financial misreporting distorts
the allocation of labor between firms: it increases the relative cost of labor
for non-fraud firms, just as it increases their cost of capital, and, on the
margin, reduces hiring.124 Fraud in the secondary market for securities
misallocates shares among traders, but does not misallocate capital between
firms and does not distort funding for new projects.125 In contrast, the market
120

Emuna Braverman, Enron’s Collateral Damage, Nov. 16, 2002,
http://www.aish.com/ci/be/48881897.html/.
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Ball, supra note 57, at 298.
122
Assume that fraud delays bankruptcy by one year during which the employee earns
$80,000. During that time, the best alternative job would have paid $70,000. When fraud is
revealed, the employee loses her job, is unemployed for six months and then finds another job
that pays $60,000 in another state, and incurs $10,000 in moving expenses. Without fraud, the
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six months of unemployment. In sum, the employee benefits $10,000 during fraud, but loses
$15,000 after it is unmasked, a net loss of $5,000 compared with the no-fraud scenario.
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Letter from Sherron Watkins, Vice President of Corporate Development, to Kenneth
Lay, Chief Executive Officer of Enron Corp. (on file with author), available at
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/empltr2lay82001.pdf/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2012).
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See Greenfield, Unjustified Absence, supra note 111, at 743 (noting that “the cost of
labor for the economy as a whole would rise because workers would have to be compensated
for being subject to fraud by their employers”).
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Assuming no new debt or primary equity offerings.
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for labor is a primary market. Fraud misallocates labor from a “higher-value
use to a lower-value use [and thus] inflicts a deadweight loss on society in
every case.”126 Overall, fewer workers are hired than would be in a world
without securities fraud.
As a result, accounting fraud is costly for employees, who cannot reduce
that risk through diversification. The discussion about the implications of
financial misrepresentations on employees applies equally to suppliers,
vendors, and customers that make firm-specific investments or operate in
markets where changing contractual partners is particularly costly. Suppliers,
vendors, or customers that are organized as firms might pass on the cost to
their providers of financial and labor capital, and perhaps down the chain—
producing second and third order effects of financial misrepresentations.127
3. Do Non-Shareholders Care About Financial Disclosures?
One might argue that employees, for example, do not read and rely on
financial disclosures. Even if they did, a public firm’s disclosures are
directed at the shareholders, not employees, so employee reliance is
irrelevant. This Article offers four related responses.
First, the business community and some commentators seem to believe
that public disclosures “are increasingly useless as sources of
information.”128 There is no empirical evidence that this is in fact true. Public
disclosures, and in particular audited financial statements, are generally
perceived as cheap to find, comprehensive, and reliable because they are
audited and certified, and carry a non-trivial risk of liability if found to be
false.129
But even if it were true that audited financial statements were irrelevant
to investors, that says little about whether they are relevant to a firm’s
employees. Many employees have access to private information about their
employers, but the information is often incomplete and unverified. The
larger, the more complex, and the more diversified the firm, the less useful is
employees’ private information about their employer. It is rational for
employees to rely on publicly-disclosed information unless they believe their
private information is more accurate (e.g., because they are involved in or
126

Greenfield, Unjustified Absence, supra note 111, at 749.
Welfare economics recognizes the existence of second and third order effects as firms
pass on the cost to their counterparties, workers and customers, as customers cut-back on or
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APPROACH 635–38 (8th ed. 2009).
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19, 2011, at A17.
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See Sadka, supra note 4, at 447 (noting that “enforcement makes financial statements
credible”).
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aware of the fraudulent scheme).130 Most public firms are sufficiently large
that the vast majority of their employees really do not have access to the sort
of internal information that would flag fraud.131
Second, fraud begets more fraud. When a firm releases a false financial
statement, its voluntary disclosures and its observable actions must be
consistent with the false statement, or else fraud will be discovered.132 Mass
layoffs at a time that a firm is reporting exponentially growing revenues are
suspicious, at the least.
Firms’ managers recognize that employees read publicly disclosed
information about the firm. For example, the auditor of Groupon, an online
daily deal vendor, recently identified material weaknesses in the firm’s
internal controls, which usually signals more serious problems. Shortly after
the disclosure, Groupon’s CEO Andrew Mason addressed the firm’s 11,000
employees in a town hall meeting in order to reassure them that the firm was
taking steps to fix the problem.133 Surely, the rank-and-file employees were
not only concerned about the value of their Groupon stock, but also about
their jobs.
Third, it is true that investors, creditors, and employees care about
different information. Any information that moves the stock price is arguably
relevant to investors. Banks and institutional creditors care about the risk of
default and the liquidation value of their claims, so they are largely
indifferent to firm performance above a certain threshold. For example,
institutional creditors are very sensitive to a firm’s systemic weaknesses in
internal controls that affect the firm’s overall control environment and
financial reporting process, because they increase the uncertainty about the
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firm’s creditworthiness and liquidation value.134 Creditors are substantially
less concerned about improper accounting of individual transactions.135
On the other hand, most employees, suppliers, and vendors have openterm and implicit contracts with the firm. As a result, they are sensitive to
specific information that makes contract termination more likely, such as
declining sales or revenues of particular divisions and mounting debt burden,
but they also care about general risk that the firm will lay off people on a
large scale and shrink production. When faced with high debt payments,
firms usually terminate employees first, before they default on a loan.136 As a
result, at-will employees are quite sensitive to information about the
performance of the firm and its divisions, as well as the firm’s loan burden.
And finally, one might contend that firms disclose their financial
information to investors, and thus other market participants have no right to
rely on it: their reliance is not justifiable in a legal sense. That may be, but
that is only an argument against private causes of action, not against taking
the total cost of securities fraud into account in public regulation and
enforcement. Once relevant information is publicly disclosed, market
participants will use it and relying on it. Moreover, it is social welfare
enhancing for market participants to rely on accurate disclosures and make
better-informed investment decisions.137 Conversely, their reliance on
fraudulent financial disclosures reduces social welfare.138 Even if the
disclosing firm’s employees have no legal right to sue for financial
misrepresentations, the harms they suffer ought to be included in the
calculation of the total harm that the false disclosure causes.
B. Intra-firm Cost: Evidence
No doubt, financial misrepresentations harm the firm’s shareholders.
Dozens of studies report median stock-price declines ranging from 6
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percent139 to a high of 38 percent.140 But as the theoretical discussion above
suggests, financial manipulation harms the firm’s non-shareholder
constituents also. Not surprisingly, the value of the firm’s debt usually
declines when fraud is revealed.141 Thus far underappreciated has been the
harm to employees.
First, a couple caveats are in order. Most of the studies reported in this
Article focus on the effects of recent restatements, issued between 1997 and
2002. It is possible that the period was significantly different because the
frequency of manipulation was relatively high. Between 1988 and 2008, on
average 21 firms per year faced an SEC enforcement action for securities
fraud. Between 1997 and 2002, the average was 50 percent higher, or 32
firms per year.142 As a result, the findings reported below might not be
representative of accounting fraud generally.
In addition, most studies discussed report effects of all restatements, not
just restatements accompanied by an enforcement action. An enforcement
action is usually a strong signal for fraud, but a restatement without an
enforcement action does not necessarily signal the absence of fraud. The
SEC has historically used its limited budget to target smaller frauds and “the
more obvious and spectacular cases of earnings manipulation.”143
This warrants two further observations. First, social welfare losses
accompany even entirely innocent misstatements, but fraudulent
misrepresentations ought to produce greater losses.144 If a misrepresentation
is truly innocent, managers have no incentive to engage in costly masking
strategies to avoid detection. An error might induce them to pursue an illinformed business strategy, but will not lead to investments specifically
chosen to disguise fraud. In addition, if managers do not try to conceal
errors, it is plausible that the errors are detected and corrected sooner.
Moreover, it is likely that honest managers will notice a discrepancy that is
significant, suggesting that erroneous misstatements should also be smaller
than those that are fraudulent. Finally, if innocent errors are distributed
normally, they should cancel each other out (at least to some extent), some
overstating earnings and others understating them. One would not expect
entire industries to be distorted. As a result, measuring the effects of
accounting fraud by looking at all restatements understates social welfare
139
Particia M. Dechow, Robert G. Sloan & A.P. Sweeney, Causes and Consequences of
Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, 13
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140
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142
Goldman, Stefanescu & Peyer, supra note 10, at 30 & tbl.3.
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2013]

THE COST OF SECURITIES FRAUD - DRAFT

31

losses that each incident of fraud causes (assuming that at least some
restatements are entirely innocent).145
1. The Cost of Fraud to Employees
Few studies have attempted to study whether and how harmful is
accounting fraud to the firm’s employees and labor markets generally.
Professors Kedia and Philippon estimated the real economic costs of
financial misstatements to labor markets by examining a large sample of
restating firms between January 1997 and June 2002, when about ten percent
of all listed firms restated their earnings at least once.146 They found that
restating firms hired and invested more than comparable firms during periods
of suspicious accounting, and reduced labor and borrowing, and sold capital
assets after the restatement.147 To maintain consistency between reported
numbers and their business operations, restating firms mimicked firms that
were growing as fast as the numbers would suggest.148 The authors showed
that overinvestment would not have been possible but for the financial
misrepresentation.149
The implications of the Kedia and Philippon study are significant.
Restating firms overhired and overinvested during the period of the
misrepresentation and reduced both labor and investment thereafter. The
subsequent decline is not offset by the earlier growth—it exceeds it and
exceeds substantially the trends in the economy. While all non-farm payrolls
increased by 6.7% between 1997 and 1999 and then declined by 1.5% in
2000 to 2002, employment in restating firms increased by 500,000 (25%)
and then fell by 600,000.150
145
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See Kedia & Philippon, supra note 43, at 2172 (noting that theirs is the first article to
study the “effect of earnings management on the allocation of resources”).
147
Id. at 2171, 2183, 2184 & tbl. 3 (finding that employment growth during the period of
fraudulent reporting is 4.1% higher than in comparable non-fraud firms, and 4.4.% lower in
post-restatement periods; similarly with investments—4.4% higher during fraud and 5.6%
lower thereafter).
148
Id. at 2185–87 (showing that “the magnitude of the earnings management and the
degree of distortions in employment and investment are related, and that it is unlikely that a
similar dynamic of employment and investment could happen without earnings
manipulation”).
149
Id. at 2171.
150
Id. at 2193, 2194 & fig. 3.
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More troubling is that industries marred by restatements lost jobs
permanently, even where rivals were able to reclaim the restating firms’
market share—an expected boon for the shareholders. Instead of expanding
their employment and investment to compensate for the losses of restating
firms, rivals, too, reported negative employment and investment growth,
coupled with strong labor productivity growth, compared with non-restating
firms in more honest industries.151 However, increased labor productivity
was not offset by higher wages.152
IV. FINANCIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS AND EXTERNAL COST
A. The Cost of Fraud to Rivals: Theory
1. Economic Learning
Securities laws require firms to disclose specific information about lines
of business, the cost of sales, and market share, which is useful to that firm’s
present and potential rivals. Unlike in a stylized financial model where risk
and expected returns of each project can be accurately calculated in advance,
real-life managers do not know ex ante which business strategy is optimal,
and so they look to their rivals as gauges of what the market wants. Other
firms’ financial disclosures and annual reports are “excellent source
document[s]” that mitigate uncertainty about industry-level demand and
costs, help firms in the same industry make strategic decisions, and
distinguish good projects from bad ones.153 They are also cheap (certainly
cheaper that industrial espionage), comprehensive, and relatively reliable,

151
In other words, non-restating firms increase their sales per employee (i.e., claim some
of the restating firms’ market share), but do not hire any new employees. See id. at 2195,
2197.
152
See id. at 2193.
153
Durnev & Mangen, supra note 10, at 680–81 (citing from P. Moon & K. Bates, Core
Analysis in Strategic Performance Appraisal, 4 MGMT. ACCT. RES. 139, 140 (1993)); Phillip
G. Berger & Rebecca Hann, Segment Disclosures, Proprietary Costs, and the Market for
Corporate Control, at 30 (finding evidence that competitors cannot learn proprietary
information about segment profitability unless it is disclosed); Bushman & Smith, supra note
138, 293–94. A number of studies suggest that firms copy more than just their peers’ business
strategy. Firms mimic their rivals’ restatement choices, with some industries preferring the
more transparent restatement preceded by a Form 8–K filing, other “restating under the radar.”
Linda A. Myers, Susan Scholz & Nathan Y. Sharp, Restating Under the Radar? Determinants
of Restatement Disclosure Choices and the Related Market Reactions 3–4 (Sept. 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1309786/ (citing to a half
dozen studies).
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because they are audited and certified, and carry a non-trivial risk of liability
if found to be false.154
If the market appears to reward particular strategies reported in financial
disclosures, rivals will mimic what they perceive to be the best performer. If
a line of business appears to be profitable, others firms might be attracted to
enter the same market. While mandatory disclosure might reduce
(monopolistic) profit margins and thus harm disclosing firms, it plays an
important role in technology development, which is critical to growth.
Significant misreporting, particularly one of “core accounts, such as
sales, market share, and cost,” 155 impairs rivals’ ability to discern the value
of new business strategies, and other market participants’ ability to
understand the markets in which they operate.156 As a result of a
misrepresentation, an entire industry might overinvest, overborrow, and
overhire.157
2. Distorted Competition
Fraudulent firms often adopt inefficient pricing or output to mask fraud,
to which their rivals respond. Unless the fraudulent firm operates a
monopoly without complements or substitutes, its pricing or quantity
decisions—distorted to correspond with fraudulent financial reporting—
distort product markets.158 Professor Gil Sadka found that while WorldCom
was misreporting its financials, it charged low prices and increased its
market share.159 Its competitors, Sprint and AT&T, responded by cutting
their prices, and saw a substantial decline in their operating margins.160
Professors Bower and Gilson estimate that if WorldCom had set prices
according to its real earnings, the industry could have generated an additional
$40 billion in profit.161 Consumers might benefit from product market
154

See J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the
Collapse of American Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 207, 209–
10 (2003) (arguing that because WorldCom’s reporting about the growth of its business was
subject to regulatory oversight, “it was reasonable to rival carriers to believe WorldCom’s
misrepresentation”).
155
Durnev & Mangen, supra note 10, at 681.
156
Brown & Angus, supra note 83, at 4. See generally Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G.
Winter, Evolutionary Theorizing in Economics, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2002, at 23
(explaining evolutionary economics and comparing its with neoclassical assumptions).
157
See Brown & Angus, supra note 83, at 4–5 (describing the process of learning and
economic growth). For example, WorldCom and the telecommunications industry
significantly overinvested in long-distance capacity and Internet cable capacity as a result of
WorldCom’s false reports about internet traffic. See Sidak, supra note 155, at 228–31.
158
Sadka, supra note 4, at 441.
159
Id. at 455–56.
160
Id. at 457.
161
Bower & Gilson, supra note 139, at 20.
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distortions in the short-term. But if fraud bankrupts an entire industry,
consumers are harmed in the long run, especially if the goods are durable.162
Alternately, fraud might “work” and allow the firm to cement a dominant
position in the industry. Waste Management, a company that “fostered a
culture of fraudulent accounting,” was charged with fraud not once, but
twice.163 Yet it survived relatively unscathed and today dominates the market
for solid waste removal, often charging monopolistic prices for its services—
great for its shareholders, less so for consumers.
Professor Patricia Dechow and her collaborators confirmed empirically
that fraudulent firms generally increased their scale during fraud.164 But, the
size of the increase depended on the competitiveness of the industry. Fraud
can substantially distort non-competitive product markets and produce
billions of dollars in deadweight losses, as World-Com and its impact on the
telecommunications industry demonstrate.165 In truly competitive markets
where price is set by marginal cost, managers cannot as easily expand their
firm’s market share either by lowering prices or increasing sales. If they do,
they will quickly bankrupt the firm and fraud will be exposed.
Product market competition thus affects the size of the distortion from
fraud, but not its existence: one firm’s change in price or output will always
shift the equilibrium and affect the prices or output of other firms’
products.166
3. Contagion
Assuming that fraud is an idiosyncratic event, rivals should, in theory,
benefit, not lose, from its unmasking. Discovery of accounting fraud is costly
for the firm, and so its rivals could use that opportunity to grab that firm’s
market share, which should increase their stock price and employment.167
162

Sadka, supra note 4, at 442 & n.4. For example, when American carmakers were near
bankruptcy during the 2008–09 financial crisis, consumers were vary of buying GM cars for
fear they would not be covered by the warranty. To allay their concerns, the federal
government guaranteed their warranty claims.
163
SECURITIES EXCH. COMM’N, WASTE MANAGEMENT FOUNDER, FIVE OTHER FORMER
TOP OFFICERS SUED FOR MASSIVE FRAUD, http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/
wastemgmt6.htm/.
164
Dechow et al., supra note 71, at 20.
165
Sadka, supra note 4, at 461.
166
Id. at 441.
167
See Tan Xu, Mohammad Najand & Douglass Ziegenfuss, Intra-Industry Effects of
Earnings Restatements, 33 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 696, 697 (2006) (noting that an “earnings
restatement could have competitive effect because it could decrease the restating firm’s
competitiveness relative to its competitors”). See also Larry H.P. Lang & Rene M. Stultz,
Contagion and Competitive Intra-Industry Effects of Bankruptcy Announcements: An
Empirical Study, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 45 (1992) (finding that bankruptcies in concentrated
industries tend to be positively correlated with rivals’ stock prices).
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On the other hand, providers of capital do not know if rivals of the
fraudulent firm are misreporting also, so they demand higher risk premia or
sell their stock in rival firms, which depresses their stock prices. In the
accounting literature, the negative effect of discovery of accounting fraud in
one firm on equity prices of rival firms is called contagion. Two factors
cause contagion: investor concerns about rivals’ accounting quality, and the
expected higher cost for new capital.168
In addition to contagion, unmasking of fraud discloses that the prospects
of a particular industry are less rosy than previously believed. In response,
firms in that industry reevaluate their expected returns from existing
investment and reduce current investment, thereby reducing their demand for
labor and capital. Lower expected returns are reflected in lower equity prices.
B. The Cost of Fraud to Rivals: Evidence
1. Equity Market Externalities
False disclosures affect rivals in several ways. First, after the false
disclosure is released but before its falsity is revealed, rivals both, misinvest
and face a relatively higher cost of capital as compared with the fraudulent
firm. If investors are led to believe that the industry has good prospects, the
cost of capital might decline for all industry firms, to some extent offsetting
the cost of fraud to rivals (but, ceteribus paribus, increasing the cost to nonindustry firms). After the financial misrepresentation is corrected, rivals face
contagion. In addition, rivals reduce their investment levels after a
restatement because of changed opportunities for external financing, both
equity and debt, and because they reassess the expected profitability of future
projects.
Several studies find that a restatement (whether accompanied by an SEC
or DOJ enforcement action or not) has a negative effect on stock prices of
non-restating firms in the same industry. Professors Gleason, Jenkins and
Johnson, who reviewed all restatements between 1997 and 2002, found that
restating firms’ stock prices declined on average by 19.8 percent around the
announcement date,169 and their rivals’ stock prices declined by a half
percent.170 The effect on rivals of financial services firms was more
pronounced, 1.5 percent.171

168

See Xu, Najand & Ziegenfuss, supra note 168, at 698 (explaining the causes and
mechanics of the contagion effect).
169
Christi A. Gleason, Nicole Thorne Jenkins & W. Bruce Johnson, The Contagion
Effects of Accounting Restatements, 83 ACCT. REV. 83, 91 (2008).
170
Id. at 93.
171
Id.
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Professors Durnev and Mangen looked at a similar sample and
confirmed the findings of the Gleason study. They found that both, the
restating firms and their rivals experienced significantly negative abnormal
returns around the announcement date—8.28% and 0.34% respectively. But
the aggregate loss to rivals (and their shareholders) was much greater than
the harm to shareholders in the restating firm: in one case that they looked at,
the restating firm lost $141 million in market capitalization while its rivals
lost $581 million.172
Professors Goldman, Stefanescu, and Peyer’s study supplemented these
findings.173 Looking only at restatements accompanied by an SEC
enforcement action, the authors found that rivals’ stock price on average
dropped by 0.54 percent around the date that fraud is unmasked.174 Declines
were more pronounced in competitive industries, while in the most
concentrated industries rivals’ stock prices on average increased after
discovery of fraud. In the aggregate, rivals in the most competitive industries
lost almost 4-times what the restating firms lost: $295 billion vs. $80 billion,
measured by market capitalization. Rivals in the most concentrated
industries, however, gained $0.69 billion, whereas the restating firms lost
$39 billion.175
The authors argued that rivals in competitive industries are less able to
capture the fraudulent firm’s market share, both because there are many
similarly situated firms vying for customers and because firms in competitive
industries are resource-constrained.176 In contrast, rivals in concentrated
industries can use their product market power to pass along the costs of the
shock to their customers (protecting their profits and their stock price), while
rivals in competitive industries cannot do so.177
While all studies found a correlation between a restatement and a stockprice decline by rivals, they provided different explanations for that decline.
Professor Gleason and her collaborators attributed the decline to two factors:
contagion and learning. Not surprisingly, the authors found that the effect
was more pronounced when the restating firm was relatively large and when
restating and non-restating firms used the same external auditor.178 They also
found that firms with high accruals—sales recorded before cash is received,
172

Durnev & Mangen, supra note 10, at 699. The authors did not disaggregate how much
of that loss is the result of shareholders’ concerns about the firms’ accounting and how much
of the expected changes in investment strategy.
173
Goldman, Stefanescu & Peyer, supra note 10.
174
Id. at 4.
175
Id. at 15.
176
Id. at 4.
177
Joel Peress, Product Market Competition, Insider Trading, and Stock Market
Efficiency, 65 J. FIN. 1 (2010).
178
Gleason, Jenkins & Johnson, supra note 170, at 84.
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also known as accounts receivable—suffered greater losses than those with
relatively low accruals.179
Professor Gleason and her collaborators also found evidence that fraud
interferes with economic learning: a restatement conveys new information
about deteriorating industry conditions and suggests that the
misrepresentation produced overinvestment by both, the restating firm and
the industry.180 Durnev and Mangen complemented the Gleason et al.
findings and showed that rivals significantly reduce their investments within
three years after the restatement.181 They argued that rivals rely on their
peers’ financial statements in deciding whether and how much to invest. A
restatement thus conveys new information, namely that the rivals
overinvested in reliance on the false financial statements issued by peers.182
Rivals reevaluate their expected return from existing investments and reduce
current investment in response.183
Durnev and Mangen also found that restatements have a greater impact
on rivals’ investments when restating firms have a larger market share.184
The finding makes sense because there are fewer firms in more concentrated
industries, and so a misrepresentation by an industry leader is more likely to
be relied on and copied.
2. Debt Market Externalities
In addition to contagion and investment reconsideration, false financial
disclosures increase the cost of debt for fraudulent firms and their rivals both
before and after fraud is unmasked.
No empirical studies to date have estimated cost of the debt-market
distortion during fraud. Assuming that the supply of capital is limited, fraud
should distort the allocation of debt between firms. As fraudulent firms
appear healthier than they really are, they can negotiate better borrowing
terms than justified. Conversely, honest firms should face relatively worse
borrowing terms than they would absent fraud.185 In a competitive market,
higher costs of capital translate into lower levels of investment by honest
firms, depressing their employment and reducing their market share. Because
179

Id. at 83. Accruals more accurately reflect the business prospects of a firm, but they
are less reliable than measuring sales by cash flow because management can exercise more
discretion in accounting for accruals.
180
Id. at 94.
181
Durnev & Mangen, supra note 10, at 697 (finding that competitors on average reduce
investments by 5.6% in the year of the restatement, by 5.2% the following year, by 2.6% the
year thereafter and by 16.2% in the third year after the restatement in the industry).
182
Id. at 703.
183
Id. at 680–81.
184
Id. at 706.
185
Bar–Gill & Bebchuk, supra note 102, at 24.
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fraudulent firms are riskier than they appear, the net cost of misallocated debt
capital is positive.
Professors Files and Gurun studied what happens to the cost of debt for
rivals, suppliers, and customers of fraudulent firms after a restatement. The
authors reviewed the loan terms of firms that borrowed within a year of a
rivals’ restatement and found that lenders increased loan costs by five to nine
basis points.186 They found similar effects when looking at loans to firms
whose major suppliers or customers restated their earnings.187 In addition to
demanding a higher interest rate, the lenders were more likely to ask for
collateral and impose more restrictive financial covenants.188
The authors demonstrated that lenders overreact to misreporting within
the industry and along the supply chain: lenders tighten lending standards on
firms regardless of the rivals’ accounting quality or overall economic
health.189 The authors argued that higher cost of borrowing is caused by
contagion,190 but additional explanations are possible. First, a restatement is
correlated with bankruptcy, which usually leads to only partial loan
repayment. Banks face reserve requirements, and a default reduces their
ability to extend new credit. Assuming that the supply of capital is not
unlimited, the price of credit must increase after a restatement even in the
absence of contagion. Second, fraud reveals that the prospects of an industry
are less rosy than previously believed, and thus rivals’ and suppliers’ risk
profile worse, even if they never engaged in accounting improprieties
themselves.
Professors Files and Gurun reported that lenders imposed relatively
stricter post-restatement loan terms in competitive industries than in
concentrated industries (measured by firms’ relative market shares).191 The
authors attributed it to two factors: the fact that it is more difficult for firms
in competitive industries to capture the restating firm’s market share, and
contagion—the perception that firms in competitive industries are more
likely to mimic accounting practices of their peers.192 But there is another
possible explanation: firms in concentrated industries are able to pass the
cost of business shocks, like a restatement or fraud, onto employees,

186

Rebecca Files & Umit G. Gurun, Lenders’ Response to Restatements Along the
Supply Chain 20 (July 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1636862/.
187
See id. at 32 (reporting an increase in the interest rate spread by at least seven basis
points).
188
Id. at 27–28.
189
Id. at 29.
190
Id. at 21–22.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 21.

2013]

THE COST OF SECURITIES FRAUD - DRAFT

39

suppliers, and customers, and thus protect their profits.193 Knowing that,
lenders demand a lower risk premium.
C. The Cost of Fraud to the Government and Communities
Finally, fraud distorts government policy, reduces the tax base, produces
unemployment, and harms communities. Government often bases policy
decisions on required disclosures. Gregory Sidak argues that WorldCom’s
fraud distorted government policy, in addition to wreaking havoc on the
firm’s rivals.194 Quoting former FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell, Sidak
notes that federal and state governments use disclosures to set regulatory
fees, determine interstate access charges for telecommunications, set rates for
unbundled services, evaluate whether the division of federal-state jurisdiction
is proper, and perform many other activities.195
When fraud results in business exit or reduces profits and incomes, all
levels of government suffer from reduced tax revenues and increased
demand for social spending. A large firm’s failure or retrenchment causes
disproportionate impacts on the community in which it is located. After
Enron declared bankruptcy and several other local companies reported fraud,
Houston, an otherwise prosperous and growing city, experienced a recession
that was both longer and deeper than the national recession.196 Houston’s
unemployment rate is generally lower than the national average. The
Houston economy is dependent on oil prices and rises and falls with the price
of crude. From 2000 to 2006, the price of crude tripled, and so Houston
should have boomed.197 Instead, Houston’s unemployment increased in early
2002 (Enron declared bankruptcy in December 2001) and remained between
0.5 and 1 percent above the national average until late 2006.198
V. DETERMINANTS OF THE COST’S MAGNITUDE
Not all financial misrepresentations are created equal. Some firms are
more likely to misrepresent their performance than others, and some
193

See discussion infra in Part V.
See Sidak, supra note 155, at 236–37.
195
Id. at 236.
196
GREATER HOUSTON PARTNERSHIP, THE ECONOMY AT A GLANCE: HOUSTON 1 (Oct.
2011), available at http://www.houston.org/pdf/research/eag.pdf/.
197
The price of crude went from (inflation adjusted) $22.30 per barrel in 1999 to $65.03
per barrel in 2006. Inflationdata.com, Historical Crude Oil Prices, http://inflationdata.com/
inflation/inflation_rate/ historical_oil_prices_table.asp/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
198
See GREATER HOUSTON PARTNERSHIP, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, WORK FORCE,
http://www.houston.org/economic–development/facts–figures/workforce/index.aspx/
(last
visited Oct. 24, 2011).
194
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financial misrepresentations are more harmful than others. This Part briefly
explains what factors increase the likelihood that a firm will commit fraud. It
then analyzes what factors increase the social welfare effects of each
occurrence of fraud.
A. The Likelihood of Fraud
The observed prevalence of fraud produces a biased estimate of its actual
prevalence, and there is evidence that many frauds go undetected.199
Nevertheless, some observations are worth noting. Larger firms are more
likely to face an SEC enforcement action for earnings manipulation: the
largest 10.0% of firms by market capitalization accounted for 14.7% of SEC
enforcement actions for fraud between 1982 and 2005, while the smallest
decile featured in 5.1% of accounting and auditing enforcement releases
(“AAERs”).200 Greater visibility and scrutiny might explain more detection
among the larger firms, but their ability to afford the best auditors should
mitigate against fraud in the first place.
Firms in growth industries, like computer software and hardware, retail
and services, and those with substantial investments in intangible assets also
are more likely to commit accounting fraud than firms in stable industries
with substantial fixed assets the value of which depends less on managers’
judgment calls (such as refining or utilities).201 Firms with high P/E ratios,
those seeking to raise new capital and those where managers’ pay is closelylinked to stock-price performance relative to rivals’ performance (e.g.,
indexed stock options) also are more likely to misstate their financials.202
Finally, economists generally believe that product market competition
should reduce the firms’ proclivity for fraud because it reduces agency
costs,203 but the relationship “is not as easy to formalize as one might
199

Gerakos & Kovrijnykh, supra note 84, at 1 (finding that on average, 17–20% of firms
with sufficient data on COMPUSTAT exhibit significant earnings manipulation); Dyck,
Morse & Zingales, Pervasive Fraud, supra note 60, at 7 (suggesting that three out of four
frauds avoid detection).
200
Dechow et al., supra note 71, at 32 & tbl.2A.
201
Id. at 32 & tbl.2B, 34.
202
Dechow et al., supra note 71, at 42; Tracy Yue Wang & Andrew Winton, Competition
and Corporate Fraud Waves 27–29 (Jan. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http;//ssrn.com/abstract=1783752/. This observation casts doubt on Professor Bebchuk and
Fried’s proposal that stock options be indexed to better align managers’ incentives with those
of the shareholders. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).
203
See MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953); Xavier Giroud &
Holger M. Mueller, Does Corporate Governance Matter in Competitive Industries?, 95 J. FIN.
ECON. 312 (2010) (showing that protections from hostile takeovers reduce market value of
firms in concentrated industries, but not of those in competitive industries, suggesting that
product market competitions disciplines management); K.J. Martijn Cremers, Vinay B. Nair &
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think.”204 Professors Wang and Winton find evidence that there is a kernel of
truth to the notion: firms in competitive industries during periods of normal
growth are generally about half as likely as their peers in concentrated
industries to commit fraud.205 The effect is most pronounced in those
competitive industries where financial statements are highly comparable:
each firm’s disclosure provides information about other firms’ financial
disclosures.206 If a manager misrepresents the firm’s earnings, outsiders can
more easily detect that the disclosure is false by comparing it with the
disclosures of honest rivals.207
During periods of growth, however, the propensity of oligopolies for
fraud remains unchanged, while in competitive industries the likelihood of
fraud quadruples (as compared with its normal rate), and exceeds that of
firms in concentrated industries.208 Periods of growth eliminate the
constraints that competitive product markets ordinarily impose. The
combination of easy money and a need for external financing to increase
capacity creates a powerful incentive to misrepresent financials.209
Misrepresentations that paint a rosier picture than true further spur
overinvestment in capacity. The bust that inevitably follows exposes both the
fraud and the overinvestment, leading to business failure and significant
distortion in product markets as well as markets for labor and capital.210
B. The Size of the Distortion from Fraud
Several factors affect the costliness of accounting fraud: (a) size,
duration and type of the misrepresentation; (b) characteristics of the
Urs Peyer, Takeover Defenses and Competition: The Role of Takeovers, 5 J. EMP. LEGAL
STUD. 791 (2008) (reporting similar findings).
204
Bengt R. Hölmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, VOLUME I (R. Schmalensee & R. D. Willig, eds., 1989) (cited in
Karthik Balakrishnan & Daniel A. Cohen, Product Market Competition and Financial
Accounting Misreporting 3 & n.2 (Sept. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1927427/.
205
Wang & Winton, supra note 203, at 17.
206
Balakrishnan & Cohen, supra note 205, at 5, 12.
207
Id. at 3–4. See also Reese Darragh, Diamond Foods Accounting Scandal Stems from
Years of Bad Practices, Mar. 20, 2012, compliancesearch.com/…/diamond-foods-accountingscandal-stems-from-years-of-bad-practices/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2012).
208
Wang & Winton, supra note 203, at 39 & tbl.3.
209
Id. at 21.
210
The internet and telecommunication booms are recent examples. An older example
includes railroads: extensive miles of track were laid (including spurs to future towns not yet
built) by firms in the railroad industry only to be followed by numerous bankruptcies in the
late 1870s. See ILLINOIS RAILROAD BOOM, 1865–73, http://www.eslarp.uiuc.edu/ibex/archive/
vignettes/rrboom.htm. The Chicago Sun Times wrote in 1872 that wealth from the railroads
“will so overflow our coffers with gold that our paupers will be millionaires. . .” Id.
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fraudulent firm, and (c) characteristics of the markets in which the firm
operates.
1. Fraud Characteristics
A number of studies suggest that duration affects the cost of the
misrepresentation: the longer fraud remains undetected, the greater the
distortion.211 Even though a single-period misrepresentation can inflate the
stock price substantially, persistent misrepresentations distort economic
decisions more.212 Making things worse, managers announce incomedecreasing restatements of greater magnitude more slowly than they
announce restatements of smaller magnitude or those that increase income.213
Professors Yu and Yu find evidence that firms’ political spending also
delays discovery of fraud. They report that fraud persists longer and is less
likely to be detected if the firm lobbies that if it does not. Moreover, they
find that firms spend more on lobbying while the fraud is ongoing, both,
compared with non-fraud lobbying peers and compared with their own
lobbying expenditures before fraud.214
The type of the misrepresentation matters also. Rivals, suppliers, and
large customers are more likely to use and rely on a misstatement of core
accounts, such as revenues, sales, market share, and cost of goods sold, than
on the firm’s pension fund returns.215
The size of the misrepresentation, and not just its duration or type,
increases the distortion, but the correlation is weaker. A quantitatively large
financial misstatement can substantially inflate the value of the company and
distort capital and labor market allocation, as well as the firm’s product
market decisions. The discovery of fraud immediately causes the stock price
to fall substantially, lenders to accelerate their loans, and customers to flee,
which might lead to insolvency.216 The large size also suggests that
211
See Brown & Angus, supra note 83, at 28 (observing that persistent fraud is far more
damaging than intermittent fraud); James J. Park, Assessing the Materiality of Financial
Misstatements, 34 J. CORP. L. 513, 550 (2009) [hereinafter Park, Materiality] (using
fundamental analysis to argue that persistent misstatements ought to be presumptively
material).
212
Cf. William Kinney et al., Earnings Surprise “Materiality” as Measured by Stock
Returns, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 1297, 1310 (2002) (finding that the consequences of missing an
earnings target by one cent vary widely, depending on context).
213
Myers, Scholz & Sharp, supra note 154, at 25.
214
Frank Yu & Xiaoyun Yu, Corporate Lobbying and Fraud Detection, J. FIN. & QUANT.
ANAL. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=954368/) (finding that lobbying
firms evade fraud detection 117 days longer, and are 38% less likely to be detected by
regulators; and that they spend 77% on lobbying that non-fraud firms and 29% more during
fraud periods than during non-fraud periods).
215
Dechow et al., supra note 71, at 19.
216
Park, Materiality supra note 212, at 553.

2013]

THE COST OF SECURITIES FRAUD - DRAFT

43

management was aware of the misstatement, further increasing the capitalmarket penalty, and causing a larger post-fraud adjustment in business
activities.217
2. Fraudulent Firm Characteristics
Firm size affects the cost of financial misrepresentations. Larger firms,
like Enron and WorldCom, use more human and financial capital, and
produce a larger displacement in the aggregate.218 Rivals are more likely to
rely on and copy dominant firms’ behavior than they are to copy smaller
firms, including their accounting practices.219
3. Market Characteristics
The effect of competition in the markets for inputs and outputs on the
cost of securities fraud is complicated. Product market competition generally
reduces the likelihood that a firm’s managers will commit fraud.220 Similarly,
if committed, accounting fraud in concentrated industries is more likely to
distort rivals’ economic behavior.221 In markets with low barriers to entry,
fraud encourages inefficient business entry.222 In addition, market
concentration affects the size of the distortion from fraud as fraudulent firms
change their pricing and output.
Empirical evidence suggests that rivals in concentrated markets are
better able to capture the fraudulent firm’s market share after it is caught, but
that the product market itself often shrinks in the aftermath of accounting
fraud.223 In contrast, demand for audit, legal, and consulting services often
increases after financial scandals.
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See id. at 554 (suggesting that when misstatements are large, it is more likely that
management was aware of them, or at least should have been aware). The notion that large
frauds are worse than small frauds produced the rule-like quantitative standard that a financial
misstatement is immaterial unless it misrepresented net income by more than five percent. See
Matthew J. Barrett, The SEC and Accounting, in Part Through the Eyes of Pacioli, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 837, 874 (2005). That standard has since been replaced with a qualitative
standard for materiality of a financial misstatement. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64
Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,152 (1999).
218
Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 7, at 44–45.
219
See Gleason, Jenkins & Johnson, supra note 170, at 103–04 (finding that competitors’
stock prices decline significantly when the restating firm is large, but show no effect so when
the restating firm is small); Wang & Winton, supra note 203, at 2.
220
Wang & Winton, supra note 203, at 39 & tbl.3.
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See Balakrishnan & Cohen, supra note 205, at 9.
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Relative market competition also affects who ultimately bears the cost of
fraud. The conventional wisdom assumes that investors as residual owners
bear the cost of securities fraud. But this conclusion is true only for firms in
truly competitive industries, and in truly competitive, perfectly informed, and
frictionless markets for labor, capital, and products. In all other cases—the
vast majority—fraudulent firms, their rivals, and suppliers are able to shield
their profits and their stock price, and pass along the cost of business shocks
from the more competitive market for securities to the relatively less
competitive markets for labor and product markets.224
Peress finds support for the relative competitiveness hypothesis in the
product markets: firms use market power to pass on business shocks to
customers and insulate profits.225 Profits and stock prices in concentrated
industries are more stable than expected, while product prices fluctuate
wildly. Kedia and Philippon show that fraudulent firms and their rivals shift
some of the post-disclosure cost of fraud onto employees.226 After discovery
of fraud, rivals capture the fraudulent firm’s market share, but do not
increase employment.227 Files and Gurun suggest that the lack of product
market competition enables borrowers to negotiate better terms than their
peers in more competitive industries in the aftermath of fraud, presumably
because they can pass the cost onto their customers or employees.228
4. Summary
Accounting fraud at WorldCom was a perfect storm of factors that
increased its economic destructiveness. The firm was very large, with a
market capitalization of $186 billion at its peak. It misrepresented salient
information, used to evaluate its and its rivals’ performance; it capitalized
current expenses and reported line costs far below its rivals’, who were hard
pressed to compete. The misrepresentation was substantial, over $12 billion,
and went on for a while.229 And finally, WorldCom operated in a highly
further increases demand. The correction increases prices to at least marginal cost and reduces
investment, thereby shrinking the product market.
224
Cf. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, at
34, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988)
(observing that firms can transfer rents from employees to shareholders).
225
See Peress, supra note 178, at 4–5. See also Annie Gasparro, Starbucks Bumps Up
Prices, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2012, at B2 (reporting that the firm’s customers were less
sensitive to price increases than its rivals and so the firm decided to raise prices of brewedcoffee to offset higher costs caused by futures contracts for coffee—in other words, to shield
investors from its market misjudgment by passing along the cost to its customers).
226
See Kedia & Philippon, supra note 43, at 2195, 2197.
227
Id.
228
See Files & Gurun, supra note 187, at 21–22.
229
Bower & Gilson, supra note 139, at 21.
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concentrated and regulated telecommunications market. Its falsely-reported
actions were copied by rivals and adopted by the government in developing
telecommunications policy.230 Smaller frauds of shorter duration by smaller
firms in competitive markets will inevitably cause losses that are more
contained, but no less painful for terminated employees, creditors, or
contractual partners.
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND SOLUTIONS
A. Implications
Financial misrepresentations generate costs above and beyond those
suffered by shareholders of fraud-committing firms because they (1) induce
socially-wasteful investments by creditors, employees, and other
stakeholders (such as vendors, suppliers) while fraud is ongoing; (2) distort
fraudulent firm’s decisions as managers try to mask fraud; (3) interfere with
rivals’ ability to learn from fraudulent firm’s disclosures; (4) after fraud is
revealed, it produces contagion to rivals and other firms, and a costly
adjustment by shareholders and non-shareholder constituents to new
information.
Combined, these four claims lead to several tentative conclusions for
fraud regulation and enforcement. First, false disclosures cause intra-firm
harms to shareholders and non-shareholder constituents, as well as external
harms to rivals, non-rivals, and their constituents. Diffuse harms suggest that
no single private party (or class of private parties) has optimal incentives to
cause managers to internalize the cost of fraud: not investors,231 not
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See Sidak, supra note 155, at 236–37.
See Larry E. Ribstein, Market v. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 55 (2002) (arguing against
public regulation of accounting fraud because shareholders, in particular institutional
investors, can press for changes in governance both by direct communication with managers
and by making shareholder proposals). See also Joseph W. Yockey, On the Role and
Regulation of Private Negotiations in Governance, 61 S.C.L. REV. 171 (2009) (arguing that
Regulation FD impedes direct negotiation between shareholders and managers). For a less
optimistic view of shareholder negotiations with management, see Urska Velikonja,
Negotiating Executive Compensation in Lieu of Regulation, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
621 (2010).
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exchanges,232 and not analysts and others who trade on information they have
gathered.233
Second, shareholders may be the theoretical residual owners, but because
of diversification and the fraud discount, their exposure to securities fraud is
quite limited. Employees and trade creditors, on the other hand, are at risk of
securities fraud, in particular in concentrated industries, in industries where
they make substantial firm-specific investments, and where exit is costly.
Third, for every fraud that is caught, there are many that remain hidden.
While investors are indifferent to hidden fraud, firms are not. They rely on
financial disclosures of other firms to devise their business strategy, and
make misguided investments when other firms’ disclosures are false. They
pay more for capital than their fraudulent peers. That cost is borne to some
extent by providers of capital, but also by managers and employees of honest
firms. Under current law, they are not compensated for their harm even when
frauds are exposed, let alone for those that remain hidden.
Employees, trade creditors, and rival firms could, in general, rely less on
their firm’s or their peers’ financial statements (a costly proposition as
reliable information about the business environment is costly to obtain),
particularly when those statements appear too good to be true. But that is
exactly the problem with accounting fraud. If it is to work, it must be
convincing. The best frauds were “successful” precisely because managers
were able to fool the many markets in which the firm operated that their
statements were truthful. The firm’s contracting parties may want to believe
the information that is being disclosed because of their optimism bias. And
even if rivals did doubt a fraudulent firms’ numbers, their own shareholders
and market analysts might push them toward fudging their numbers.234
B. Solutions
Many of the existing mechanisms designed to protect investors by
increasing transparency and reducing the incentive to commit fraud also

232
See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (1997)
[hereinafter Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator] (arguing that the benefits of regulatory
competition would best be achieved by devolving more authority to securities exchanges);
Pritchard, Markets as Monitors, supra note 74, at 928–29 (arguing that exchanges could
enforce anti-fraud rules at lower cost than private litigation or securities regulators).
233
See e.g., Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 714 (2006).
234
In an environment with low enforcement and high rewards for fraud, all competitors
may find it optimal to commit fraud, even though the market overall would be better off if noone committed fraud. See Ing-Haw Chen, Corporate Governance Spillovers 1 (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1299652/ (observing that fraud at one firm
can lead to increased misbehavior at other firms).
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reduce the cost of fraud to non-shareholders, including requirements for
auditor independence and SEC enforcement actions.
A common theme in why fraud harms non-shareholders is their reliance
on false information. The following sections consider both less public
disclosure and better disclosure as possible remedies. The Article singled out
employees as a class of non-shareholders that is consistently harmed by fraud
and particularly powerless to diversify that risk. The last section in this Part
thus considers a couple compensation mechanisms, both private rights of
action and an administrative victim compensation fund.
1. Is Less Public Disclosure the Answer?
Disclosure has been the preferred regulatory tool of American securities
lawmakers since the 1930s. In addition to providing information to investors,
increased disclosure enhances competition, and hence static efficiency, by
informing rivals of profit opportunities and leading to production levels more
consistent with marginal cost pricing.235 Disclosure of relevant business
information produces a positive externality to the disclosing firm’s rivals,
who learn about profitable business opportunities, its suppliers and
customers, who can drive harder bargains, and its employees, who demand
higher pay or leave.236
But producing disclosures is costly for firms. The recently adopted JOBS
Act is premised on the supposition the cost of disclosure and compliance
exceeds its benefit to investors, in particular for “smaller” newly-public
firms. The JOBS Act reduces disclosure and audit obligations for five years
from the initial public offering for “emerging growth companies,” that is
companies with less than $1 billion in annual revenues.237 Some have
predicted that the Act will result in more fraud and thereby harm investors.238
But what about the effect on non-shareholders? If accurate disclosures
generate positive externalities, conversely, false disclosures must be bad for
rivals, employees, and creditors because they misdirect their investments. If
so, making disclosure less public or reducing the amount of information to be
publicly disclosed could reduce the relative share of the cost of accounting
fraud borne by non-shareholders, assuming all else is equal.
Although firms provide disclosures for their present and future
shareholders, the Exchange Act requires public firms to must file their
quarterly and annual reports with the SEC, which makes them publicly
available through its online database EDGAR. If information were provided
235

Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure, supra note 29, at 1345.
Id. at 1345–46.
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to current shareholders directly, as is the case with privately-held firms, one
might expect the external cost of fraud to be smaller. Rivals would make
economic decisions independently of their peers, and with fewer eyes
looking, fraudulent managers would be under less pressure to change hiring,
investment, and pricing to mask fraud. Less scrutiny, however, would likely
increase the prevalence of fraud. More fraud would, in turn, increase the cost
of capital for all firms and depress overall economic growth.
Instead, the amount of information that firms are required to disclose
publicly could be limited to information that is unlikely to be of interest to
rivals, for example, such as the cost of sales (but still be disclosed to current
shareholders and audited). Even assuming that the prevalence of fraud would
not increase—likely an unrealistic assumption—reducing the amount of
useful publicly disclosed information would also reduce the positive
externality of disclosure.239 At least superficially, it would appear highly
unlikely that less disclosure will on net increase social welfare.
2. Improving Disclosure
The current disclosure, audit, and compliance regime is not cheap. If the
same resources could be deployed more efficiently, better disclosure ought to
reduce the incidence and the cost of accounting fraud. This section briefly
considers forensic audits, targeted enforcement, and qui tam actions for
securities fraud as tools to improve disclosure.
Under the current regime, managers select their firms’ auditor, but
managers are usually very loyal. A firm changes its auditor only in the
aftermath of scandal. As a result, auditors know the managers that they audit
and rely on the information that managers provide. The symbiotic
relationship at best, dampens the auditor’s appetite for suspicious
questioning, and at worst, leads auditors to rubber-stamping fraud.240
Severing the agency relationship between management, who selects the
auditor, provides the information, and pays for the audit, and the auditor
ought to reduce the conflict of interest and improve audit quality.241 Forensic
audits are usually commissioned by courts or enforcement agencies during
an investigation into accounting improprieties, such as during the Lehman
239
Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure, supra note 29, at 1345–46. Private
firms, for example, disclose publicly very little information.
240
A senior auditor with one of the Big Four suggested that all four firms let their largest
clients get away with suspicious accounting for fear of losing their business. Interview with
Anonymous, Manager, KPMG, in Annapolis, MD (Apr. 27, 2012).
241
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement
Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413 (2004) (proposing financial
statement insurance); Joshua Ronen, Corporate Audits and How to Fix Them, 24 J. ECON.
PERSP. 189, 189–90 (2010) (same).
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Brothers bankruptcy. While they are expensive and time-consuming, they are
also very effective.
For example, ten percent of public firms could be randomly selected
every year and required to undergo a forensic audit.242 Accounting fraud is
both, more common and more harmful to non-shareholders in concentrated
industries, so those could be targeted more often. Alternately, a forensic
audit could be ordered if red flags are raised, such as bankruptcy,243 or
certain accounting practices that have been found to signal fraud, for
example high and/or spiking accruals.244 The SEC might not have the
resources to conduct many forensic audits, but the cost could be shifted to
firms. In exchange, other compliance requirements could be lifted, such as
the controversial auditor attestation to management’s assessment of the firm’
internal controls under Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s Section 404.245
In addition, the SEC and judges could take into account aggregate social
losses from fraud when choosing sanctions for fraudulent firms and their
managers. The SEC declared in 2006 that it would consider “the extent of
societal harm” when penalizing firms and managers for securities fraud, but
it is yet to consider harm beyond that suffered by the shareholders.246
Similarly, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines allow judges to take into
consideration total economic harm caused by the offense, but the author is
not aware that any judge had looked beyond the shareholders.247 In addition,
shifting the sanction onto managers ought to reduce the likelihood of
fraud.248
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James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee, The Effects of Communication Among
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243
About one-third of firms charged with accounting fraud end in bankruptcy, and of the
firms that file for bankruptcy, about a third is found to have committed fraud before filing. See
source cited supra in note 89. This suggests that courts reviewing bankruptcy petitions should
routinely look for securities fraud. But see Kelli Alces, Limiting the SEC’s Role in
Bankruptcy, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 631 (2010) (arguing that SEC should not
investigate and punish bankrupt firms).
244
COSO STUDY, supra note 89, at 45 (noting that revenue fraud is consistently the most
common variety of accounting fraud).
245
Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the public firm’s auditor to attest
to, and report on, management’s assessment of its internal controls. The Dodd-Frank Act
exempted small firms with less that $75 million in equity from having to comply with 404(b)
(4,700 public firms) because of the common perception that the cost of compliance exceeded
the benefit to investors.
246
STATEMENT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION CONCERNING FINANCIAL
PENALTIES, Jan. 4, 2006, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm/.
247
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, §2B1.1(b).
248
See Velikonja, Leveraged Sanctions, supra note 20, at 2183–84.

50

THE COST OF SECURITIES FRAUD - DRAFT [Vol. 54:nnn

Finally, in Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud, Dyck, Morse,
and Zingales found that employees discovered and reported 19 percent of all
frauds, more than any other group, including financial regulators, auditors,
and securities analysts.249 Employees blew the whistle even before the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act protected them from retaliation and before any monetary
incentives were available.
The Dodd-Frank Act authorized monetary awards for whistleblowers
whose tips lead to a successful SEC enforcement action.250 While awards for
whistleblowers do not prevent fraud per se, they might reduce its duration, at
least on the margin. If employees are deterred from reporting fraud because
they might never work again, compensation is a useful incentive. The awards
under the Dodd-Frank Act are conditional on the SEC successfully pursuing
the enforcement action and are limited to the SEC’s discretion. A true qui
tam action that would eliminate the SEC as the intermediary and allow
employees to sue for fraud directly would strengthen employees’ incentives
and give them greater control over the process. Fraud duration is an
important determinant of the cost of fraud to non-shareholders. It is fair to
assume that, on the margin, employee qui tam actions would expose fraud
sooner and thus decrease the social welfare losses.
3. Victim Compensation
As this Article suggests, employees (and trade creditors, suppliers,
vendors, customers, and their employees to the extent that firms externalize
the cost) are among the victims of securities fraud who cannot diversify the
risk of loss from fraud. To the extent that firms shift some of cost of fraud
from shareholders to employees—by reneging on implicit contracts not to
fire, cut pay, or extract more work for the same pay—it would make not only
practical, but also economic sense to require shareholders to internalize the
cost of the firm’s activity.251 Requiring fraudulent firms and their managers
to compensate all victims of fraud would seem to be the next rational step.
This section considers employee lawsuits and a compensation fund,
administered by a public agency, as possible remedies.
a. Victim Lawsuits

249
Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on
Corporate Fraud? 52 & tbl.2 (CRSP Working Paper No. 618, 2007) available at
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/finance/papers/who%20blows%20the%20whistle.pdf/.
250
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1841 (2010). The SEC has since adopted
rules implementing the statutory provision. See 17 C.F.R. Part 240 and 249 (providing for a
reward when the enforcement action yields a monetary sanction of $1,000,000 or more).
251
See discussion supra in Part V.

2013]

THE COST OF SECURITIES FRAUD - DRAFT

51

Rallying against securities fraud class actions is a favorite pastime of
securities law professors. Class actions are costly, they overcompensate
shareholders, who can diversify away the cost of fraud, and fail to deter the
dishonest managers, since they never pay out of pocket.252 Employees, on the
other hand, are harmed by fraud because they stay with the fraudulent firm in
reliance on the false picture of its prosperity. When the firm discloses fraud,
they lose their jobs and their investment in the firm. Could employees either
individually or as a class bring an action for fraud?
Without a federal cause of action like the shareholder class action,
employees would have to rely on the common law cause of action for
fraud.253 Courts have been extremely reluctant to allow employees to sue
firms for common law fraud by managers. Courts have held either, that the
vague statements firms made about the firm’s prospects were not enforceable
promises that induced reliance (e.g., “The plant is now profitable.”), or were
forward-looking statements on which legal reliance is unwarranted (e.g.,
“We will not close the plant if it remains profitable.”).254 Even if employees
could somehow overcome the reliance hurdle by showing that they in fact
relied on specific fraudulent financial disclosures, managers and the firm
could defeat their claim by arguing that any disclosures were intended for
investors, not employees. Employees’ reliance would not be legally
justifiable.
Moreover, proving damages would pose severe evidentiary problems.
The value of shareholders’ residual claims can be determined with relative
ease by looking at the stock price. But serious event studies are needed in
252
See e.g., Alexander, supra note 45, at 1508–14 (proposing that damages be replaced
with fines); Arlen & Carney, supra note 53, at 720 (proposing that firm-level liability be
eliminated); Baer, supra note 41, at 1035 (proposing that insurance replace private actions);
Bratton & Wachter, FOTM, supra note 73, at 69–70 (proposing that FOTM be abolished and
the SEC step up its enforcement efforts); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform:
The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U.L. REV. 301, 349–53 (2004)
(proposing shifting liability to auditors); John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class
Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1582–84
(2006); Alicia Davis Evans, Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 101 (2007)
(proposing insurance in lieu of the class action); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for
Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 641–42 (1996) (proposing capping
damages in securities class actions); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A
Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U.L.Q. 491, 540–46 (2001);
Pritchard, Markets as Monitors, supra note 74, at 983 (proposing penalties instead of damages
to be imposed by exchanges instead of individual plaintiffs); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming
Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private
Enforcement of Rule 10b–5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1301 (2008) (proposing that the SEC
screen securities class actions).
253
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fraud-on-the-market cases to suss out precisely what part of the stock price
decline was caused by fraud and what is noise.255 Employment contracts are
not tradeable and their value not ascertainable with ease, let alone any loss in
the value of their human capital that results from fraud. Fraud causes
employees to lose firm-specific investments. What is the value of that
investment, and for how much have employees already been compensated?
Many managers commit fraud when firms are faltering. How would
employees prove that their jobs would not have been among those eliminated
in the face of poor firm performance? If employees refrained from job
search, how would they show their opportunity cost? What is the cost of
reputational harm and how to disaggregate it from noise in the labor market?
Inevitably, firms would worry that if workers are compensated for
joblessness, they will stop looking for work. Should employees’ claims
receive priority in bankruptcy, similar to shareholder settlements in
WorldCom and Enron?
Finally, the fact-specific nature of these actions would likely make it
cost-prohibitive if brought individually; the cost of litigation would exceed
the loss to any individual employee. Could a class action be certified? The
recent Supreme Court decision in WalMart v. Dukes suggests that class
certification would be difficult.256 The fraud-on-the-market presumption of
reliance used by public shareholders would not be available for employee
claims. Employees would probably have to show actual reliance on particular
false disclosures or statements, and the facts surrounding reliance would
inevitably vary from employee to employee. Without commonality, a class
action could not be certified.
The high cost of enforcement coupled with serious information problems
suggests that a private right of action for employees might not be a costeffective tool to reduce the incidence of fraud, even if legal obstacles could
somehow be overcome.
b. Victim Compensation Fund
If private remedies are unlikely to succeed, public ones might do better.
When pursuing fraudulent firms, the SEC does not need to show reliance nor
damages, the barriers to private employee fraud actions. The SEC can
impose civil fines against firms so long as the misrepresentation was
material, was related to the sale of securities, and was made with scienter.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also authorized the SEC to distribute civil fines that
it collects from fraudulent firms to the victims of fraud, and the SEC has
255
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distributed funds to defrauded shareholders in a number of high-profile
cases.257
As the Article argues, the shareholders are not the only victims of fraud.
Thus, this Article proposes that Fair Funds be distributed to non-shareholder
victims or securities fraud as a mechanism to force shareholders to
internalize the cost of securities fraud. Forced cost-internalization is a more
elegant solution, and one that is more likely to stick, than hoping that
directors and managers will maximize social welfare, instead of shareholder
welfare.258
The victim compensation fund would be modeled after the fair fund for
defrauded shareholders. It would be created at the public agency’s discretion
whenever it appeared that non-shareholders were harmed when a firm
misrepresented its financial performance. When making the decision to
establish the fund, the administering agency would take into account factors
that suggest high employee losses, such as substantial firm-specific
investment and employee specialization, termination of a substantial number
of employees and their inability to find alternative jobs, reputational harms,
and whether fraud caused bankruptcy or merely delayed it. The agency
would decide the size of the compensation fund as well as simple distribution
rules. For example, terminated employees could receive three-, six, twelveor more months’ salary depending on how long they remained jobless.
Employees who could prove greater losses could collect more.
In the current political climate, it is implausible that a new agency could
be created to protect the interests of employees during securities fraud.259
Creative reading of the securities acts and their legislative history, however,
suggests that the SEC could adopt a rule authorizing the creation of the
victim compensation fund.
Section 308 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, entitled “Fair Funds for
Investors,” authorizes the SEC to distribute civil penalties collected from
securities violators to “the victims of such violation.”260 Elsewhere in the
same section, the statute quite clearly limits its scope to “injured
257
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investors,”261 but not in the provision that authorizes the SEC to distribute
funds collected from fraudulent firms and individuals to the victims. At the
least, the text of the Fair Funds Statute does not preclude the inclusion of
employees among the victims of securities fraud.
The “words of the statute should be read in context, the statute's place in
the overall statutory scheme should be considered, and the problem Congress
sought to solve should be taken into account.”262 The broader statutory
structure of securities regulation suggests that honest securities markets serve
an important resource allocation function in the economy. The Exchange Act
itself notes that fraud and manipulation “precipitate, intensify, and prolong”
“[n]ational emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and . . .
affect the general welfare.”263 Moreover, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that
adopted the Fair Funds Statute was motivated by “social and economic
dislocation, not simply investor losses.”264 It “refused shareholders any more
governance power, either in terms of voting rights . . . or private
litigation,”265 and instead increased public firms’ public accountability.266
In the light of the text of the Fair Funds Statute and the purpose of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act as well as securities regulation more generally, Section
308(a) could be said to be ambiguous under Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC.267 If
so, a regulatory interpretation that includes employees among those harmed
by securities fraud and thus plausibly “the victims of such violation,” should
pass constitutional muster.
Realistically, however, such a rule might not survive judicial review
without clear statutory authorization. In Goldstein v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit
invalidated the SEC’s rule that provided that investors in hedge funds are
“clients” of the hedge fund’s investment adviser.268 Instead, the Court
reasoned that the hedge fund itself is the client, and denied individual
investors redress against the investment adviser for fiduciary violations. By
doing that, the Court signaled that it considered the SEC’s authority to
interpret statutes to be very limited.
Even with statutory authorization, the D.C. Circuit might vacate a rule
authorizing the victim compensation fund if the rule fails the cost-benefit
analysis, as illustrated by Business Roundtable v. SEC.269 Section 971 of the
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Dodd-Frank Act authorized the SEC to adopt a rule requiring companies to
include shareholder nominees for the board of directors in the companies’
proxy solicitation.270 After a lengthy notice-and-comment period, the SEC
adopted a rule requiring proxy access.271 The D.C. Circuit panel struck down
the rule, arguing that the costs to investors exceeded the benefits.272
Measuring the victim compensation fund rule by the same yardstick—the
costs and the benefits to investors—would inevitably doom it.
Nonetheless, the Article suggests that the SEC claim the power it has
under the enabling legislation. Alternately, the Article proposes that the SEC
use its authority to distribute fair funds to shareholders sparingly. Unless
shareholders bear the full cost of fraud, the SEC should pay fines to the
Treasury.273 Assuming that at least some employees displaced by securities
fraud are eligible for unemployment and welfare benefits, shareholders of
fraudulent firms ought to contribute to covering the Treasury’s cost.
c. Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions
Few legal instruments have been criticized for as long and by as many
different authors as the shareholder class action, and for good reason. Class
actions are costly, they overcompensate shareholders, who can diversify
away the cost of fraud, and fail to deter the wrongdoer managers, since they
virtually never pay out of pocket. In a recent article, Professors Bill Bratton
and Michael Wachter proposed eliminating private shareholder class actions
in exchange for strengthened public enforcement.274 This Article supplies yet
another reason in favor of getting rid of the shareholder class action: the cost
and the distraction associated with litigation further harms the firm’s
employees, suppliers, and creditors.
CONCLUSION
This Article makes and supports, theoretically and empirically, a set of
controversial claims. First, shareholders are not the only group harmed by
false securities disclosures. Second, shareholders are in the best position to
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limit their exposure to fraud in the secondary market. The firm’s employees,
its suppliers, vendors, customers, and rivals cannot as easily self-insure
against fraud.
If so, then much of the modern debate whether the benefit of securities
regulation to investors exceeds its cost is hopelessly confused. The
misunderstanding of the economic cost of securities fraud has lead to
misguided legislative, enforcement, and policy choices, including the JOBS
Act’s reduced disclosure and compliance requirements, and the diminishing
appetite for criminal and administrative enforcement against firms.
Hopefully, this Article can redirect the debate and policy-making to a more
complete understanding of the cost of fraud.

